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TORT LIABILITY OF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICERS

ONE

By EDWARD G.

JENNINGS*

of the most perplexing problems of administrative law,'
as of tort law also, 2 concerns the individual liability for
damages of public officers who, in the performance of official
duties, commit errors causing injury to private personal or property
rights. Herein becomes sharply apparent the impact of modern
public law development upon traditional concepts. The pride and
glory of Anglo-American common law have been thought to be
the principle that no man is above the law administered by the
ordinary courts of the realm, 3 and that "color of office" consequently creates no immunity for the "unlawful invasion of another's rights."'4 In tenacity this principle has been paralleled
by, and is no doubt in part a consequence of, that of the sovereign's
own immunity.' The latter concept, derived from the time of an
*Assistant Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
"'Administrative law" is used in the meaning of Freund "as law controlling the administration, and not as law produced by the administration."
Freund, Cases on Administrative Law, 2nd ed., p. v.
2See 2 Cooley, Torts, 4th ed., secs. 295-317; Harper, Torts, sec. 298.
3Dicey, The Law of the Constitution, 8th ed., pps. xxxvii, 324-326.
Compare the statement of a recent American writer that "Anglo-American
scholars and jurists are becoming increasingly conscious of the weakness
of our law in that class of actions which has to do with obtaining money
damages for injuries to person and property caused by governmental officers, employees, and agencies." Pfiffner, Public Administration 438-439.
4Downs v. Lazzelle, (1916) 102 W. Va. 663, 668, 136 S. E. 195, 197:
"To warrant petitioners in invading the curtilage and close of the plaintiffs
and tearing down their wall, they must have a clear legal right to enter
for that purpose. Otherwise they will be without immunity from damages
for their wrong; and the fact that they are officers or agents of the State
furnishes no defense, unless they be clothed with the full panoply of the
law." See also D'Aquilla v. Anderson, (1929) 153 Miss. 549, 558, 120 So.
434, 436: "One of the first things an officer should learn on assuming the
duties of office is the law bearing on his office and its duties. He does not
become the law of the land by assuming office, and can do no act unless
the law authorizes him to do so, which will affect any other person's
rights, property, or liberty;" Stiles v. Municipal Council of Lowell, (1919)
233 Mass. 174, 182, 123 N. E. 615, 616: "Personal liability attaches to
executive or administrative officers who interfere with rights of individuals
in ways not authorized by law. The cloak of office is no protection to them
even when acting in good faith."
5As to the close connection between the two principles, see McCord v.
High, (1868) 24 Iowa 336, 350, where Dillon, C. J., placed much emphasis
upon the absence of any other remedy as a reason for permitting
a personal action to lie against an officer though acting in good faith; but
compare the language of the same court in Packard v. Voltz, (1885) 94
Iowa 277, 280-281, 62 N. W. 757, 758-759, in reference to the liability of
officers of subordinate political subdivisions that share the sovereign im-
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absolute personal sovereign who in strict Austinian theory could
not be the fountainhead of law and at the same time be subject
to it, seems largely anomalous now that sovereignty has become
with us an impersonal ultimate having no very direct impact upon
the reality of its exercise.6
The elimination of sovereign immunity would seem to be a first
essential of the complete solution of the problem here treated,
from the point of view both of fairness to the officer who acts in
the public interest and the exercise of whose judgment in acting
the public demands, and of assuring full compensatory justice to
the injured individual.7 Since in the minds of courts such a
munity only to the extent of the public character of their functions: "It
would certainly be an anomalous doctrine that would exempt the corporation itself from liability for the doing of a lawful act in a negligent manner,
upon the ground of its compulsory agency in behalf of the public welfare,
and at the same time affix a liability upon its agent for precisely the same
acts done under its express authority.... It must be a reason for the rule
of exemption, on the part of a political corporation, that its agency is a

public necessity, and it seems to us that the same law that would give it

exemption from liability for negligence would protect from liability the
servant through whom, only, the corporation can discharge its duty to the
public. . . . Legally, the county justifies, in that it has done no act for
which it is liable, and hence its agent, through whom it did the act, is for
the same reason justified. The same public policy that would give justification to the corporation would extend it to the legitimate means for doingr

the act." See, however, Falasco v. Hulen, (1935) 6 Cal. App. (2d) 224, 44
P. (2d) 469 (police officer held individually liable for negligence in operation of motor vehicle in line of duty). It is sometimes asserted that "A
public officer who is a member of a corporate body upon which a duty
rests cannot be liable for the neglect of that body. If there be refusal to
exercise the powers of such body, it is the refusal of the body, and not of
the individuals composing it." Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v.
Templeman, (Tex. Civ. App. 1929), 18 S. W. (2d) 936, 937. The usual
answer the courts make is that wrongful action by an officer is not official
action. A better answer is that there is nothing necessarily incongruous
in visiting personal consequences upon the individuals participating in wrongful official action, even though still regarded as official. Compare First
Nat'l Bank of Key West v. Filer, (1933) 107 Fla. 526, 533, 537, 145 So.
204, 206-208: ". . . it by no means follows that a public officer may not

. . . be held personally and individually responsible for the acts of public

boards of [or ?] official bodies, so far as he personally joins in and lends

his efforts toward the accomplishment of the wrongful acts of the body or
board itself as an entity. . . . The illegal act or omission of a public corporation or board of which the officer sued was a member, becomes the
act of those members who actually participate in its consummation, and
such officer members so participating in the illegal act or neglect may be
sued and held liable personally for the resulting damage that may have
been sustained by a person specially injured by the default in duty."
6See the thoroughgoing historical and analytical treatment of the whole
subject of sovereign immunity in Borchard, Government Liability in Tort,
(1924) 34 Yale L. J. 1, 129, (1925) 34 Yale L. J. 229, (1926) 36 Yale L.
J. 1, (1927) 36 Yale L. J. 757, 1039; see also Notes, (1930) 39 Yale L. J.
550, (1934) 43 Yale L. J. 674.
7Compare Garner, French Administrative Law, (1924) 33 Yale L. J.
597, 599: "It can now be said without possibility of contradiction that there
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means of securing a complete solution requires legislative action
s
that has not as yet been sufficiently forthcoming, the ensuing
discussion deals with the law of officers' liability on the assumption of the absence of any other form of compensatory redress
for injuries resulting from official errorP The problem becomes
one of approximating the most nearly adequate adjustment of
the respective interests of the private individual and the officer
in terms of the larger public interest that is always present in
such cases.
In the minds of those who view administrative justice in its
modem significance as an excrescence upon the legal system to be
received with suspicion, there would be nothing either startling or
undesirable in holding administrative officers generally to the
utmost accountability in the exercise of their powers and in the
same measure as private individuals to the consequences of a presumed knowledge of the law that even courts and lawyers themselves have never in fact possessed. But as it will more fully
appear, an absolute personal accountability for the exercise of administrative powers has never been uniformly the law, and an
acceptable philosophical starting point is believed to be contained
in the following language of the special committee on administrative law in its report to the American Bar Association at the 1934
meeting:
"It [the committee] recognizes and accepts, without approval
or disapproval, the apparently irresistible tendency of government
everywhere vastly to extend its scope of operations and of regulation, and, in its new undertakings, to employ administrative machinery for the making of detailed rules and the initial determination of controversies. It assumes that the administrative method
has demonstrated the advantages generally claimed for it, arising
is no other country where the rights of private individuals are so well
protected against the arbitrariness, the abuses and the illegal conduct of
the administrative authorities and where they are so sure of receiving
reparation for injuries sustained on account of such conduct [as under
the French droit administratif] ;" Allen, Bureaucracy Triumphant 48:
".. . the remedies of the subject against the State in France are easier,
speedier, and infinitely cheaper than they are in England today." Of course
the elimination of sovereign immunity need not ecessarily be coupled with
a separate system of administrative courts for the determination of suits
against the state as in France.
8
See Borchard, The Federal Tort Claims Bill, (1933) 1 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 1; Note, (1930) 39 Yale L. J. 550.
9
As to officers of "municipal" corporations generally, it is assumed
that the liability asserted arises out of the performance of "public" functions,
for which the corporation itself is not liable. Where the functions are
"proprietary," since the corporation is liable, the liability of the officer need
involve no considerations peculiar to the law of public officers.
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from the employment of a body of experts exercising continuous
supervision over a subject-matter requiring expert or specialized
experience and training. . .. [T]he committee proposes to accept
these advantages as demonstrated and, in its recommendations and
activities, to attempt to preserve them."' 1
As applied to the criminal and tortious liability of private
individuals, a rule that ignorance of the law is no excuse is no
doubt the only one generally practicable." Also there are the
situations in which affirmative action constituting an invasion by
one private individual of another's rights is not excused by his
reasonable mistake as to the other's title or by his reasonable belief in the existence of facts creating a privilege." But only
under exceptional circumstances imposing a duty to act is a private
individual under liability to anyone for nonaction, and still less
frequently is he under liability to anyone for his failure to take
affirmative action adversely affecting the person or property of
another, even although such action if taken would have been
privileged." Even today it is not for the law to encourage everyone into becoming a busybody;14 and consequently, in most instances of affirmative action constituting an interference by one
private individual with the affairs of another, the most nearly
adequate adjustment of all the interests concerned would seem to
reqtiire that the actor ascertain at his peril the facts and the law
upon which the rightfulness of his interference depends. 1' There
10(1934) 59 American Bar Association Report, 542-543.

"That "mistake of law" has come to have greater significance in relation to quasi contractual recovery, recission, or reformation, or as a defense
in suits for specific performance, see McClintock, Equity, secs. 72, 88, 93;
Woodward, Quasi Contracts, secs. 11, 35-44, 94, 134.
"As in the case of conversion by the purchase of a chattel in good faith
reliance on the seller's title, where there is no "estoppel" element that may
be asserted against the true owner, see, for example, Employers' Fire Ins.
Co. v. Cotten, (1927) 245 N. Y. 102, 156 N. E. 629; or as in case of the
privilege of arrest by a private person acting without a warrant, which is
dependent on a felony having been actually committed, see Restatement,
Torts, sec. 119; or as in case of the privilege of a private individual to abate
a private nuisance, see Restatement, Torts, sec. 201, comment (g).
"sCompare the language of section 314 of the Restatement, Torts:
"The actor's realization that action on his part is necessary for another's
aid or protection does not of itself impose upon him a duty to take such
action;" although by section 76 the actor's privilege in the defense of third
persons is stated to be "under the same conditions and by the same means
as those under and by which he is privileged to defend himself."
'4"Justice is- doing one's own business and not being a busy body."
Plato, Republic ii, 368. See Pound, Outlines of Lectures on Jurisprudence,
4th ed., p. 27.
"6Though compare the privilege of trespass and conversion that is permitted even to private individuals upon reasonable belief in their necessity
to avoid or mitigate the effects of a "public disaster," defined to include
"conflagration, flood, earthquake or pestilence," see Restatement, Torts, sec.
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is thus ordinarily imposed upon him a risk if he voluntarily assumes to act; but no duty of assuming the risk of acting.1
On the other hand the law governing a public officer's powers
and duties ordinarily imposes upon him a duty of making the
initial determinations of fact or law or both upon which the
rightfulness of their exercise depends, and of acting in accordance
with his own determinations. 17 The fact that his affirmative duty
to act may run only to the public collectively, so as not ordinarily
to subject him to the danger of a private suit for the consequences
of nonaction, 5 does not perceptibly ease the position in which
the officer thus may find himself if he may become liable for the
consequences of mistaken action-he still must steer his course
196; and the privilege of arresting a person reasonably believed to have
committed a felony that was actually committed, see Restatement, Torts, sec.
119. The pressing emergency character of such particular situations justifies
the holding
out of some incentive to affirmative private action.
' 0 There are of course the occasional instances in which a private individual is virtually conscripted into an ad hoe official character; to that
extent his liability is subject to the same special considerations applicable
to official liability. See Vandell v. Sanders, (1931) 85 N. H. 143, 145-146,
155 Atl. 193, 194-195 (defendant held privileged to violate speed ordinance
while carrying firemen to fire in his private automobile).
'TSee Raymond v. Fish, (1883) 51 Conn. 80, 96-97. Of course if the
question comes up only in a subsequent judicial proceeding involving liability
to a private individual for the consequences of nonaction, a court is not
going to hold that the officer violated a duty in failing to take the action
that his determination of the facts or law apparently called for, if it has
turned out that his determination was in error. State of mind alone does
not ordinarily determine legal controversies. But where the controversy
is entirely between the officer and the public, as in a removal proceeding,
the same entirely objective standards of legal rights and duties do not
prevail. See In re Application for Removal of Nash, (1920) 147 Minn.
383, 387, 391, 181 N. W. 570, 572-574. It is believed that a health officer
directed to quarantine against contagious disease, who should for no valid
reason refuse to quarantine a family in whose midst he honestly believes
contagious disease to exist, is no less derelict in the performance of his
duty to the public, and should be no less subject to removal as an unfit
public servant, because it happens in the particular case that he made an
error in diagnosis not entirely uncommon among physicians. From the
point of view of the public interest involved in such a state of facts, it is
much more reasonable to hold the officer subject to removal for nonaction
than to hold him subject to personal liability for having acted. See the discussion in Beeks v. Dickinson County, (1906) 131 Iowa 244, 249-250, 108
N. W. 311, 312-313, wherein the defendant health officer was held not
liable for the loss of the plaintiff's crop occasioned by- his being quarantined 8for smallpox, which it turned out he did not have.
2 For the view that public officers are not subject to private actions
for the consequences of "nonfeasance," see generally, Smith v. Iowa City,
(1931) 213 Iowa 391, 395, 239 N. W. 29, 31; Stevens v. North States
Motor, Inc., (1925) 161 Minn. 345, 348, 201 N. W. 435, 436; Bolland v.
Gihlstorf, (1916) 134 Minn. 41, 42, 158 N. W. 725; Hipp v. Ferrall,
(1917) 173 N. C. 167, 171-172, 91 S. E. 831, 832-833; Binldey v. Hughes,
(1934) 168 Tenn. 86, 93-94, 73 S. W. (2d) 1111, 1112-1113; Thomas v.
Wilton, (1884) 40 Ohio St. 516, 517; Antin v. Union High School Dist.
No. 2, (1929) 130 Or. 461, 478-479, 280 Pac. 664, 669-670.
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between the latter danger and the consequences personal to himself of the nonperformance of his public duty, which may take
the form of criminal penalties or removal.' 9 Upon the facts of
Miller v. Horton,20 only a board of commissioners thoroughly remiss in its performance of a public duty could have failed to
order the plaintiff's horses destroyed pursuant to its own honest
and reasonable finding that they were infected with glanders, entirely regardless of the subsequent judicial determination of that
issue in the plaintiff's favor, which there was neither the time
to await nor a method by which the board could have secured it
before acting.21 The risk imposed is one that even omniscience
cannot avoid, if the subsequent judicial determination happens to
22
be the one that is in error.
Industrialization, urbanization, and ever increasing rapidity of
' 9 See note 17 supra. The liability of the officer to such penalties for
nonaction of course becomes all the clearer when it turns out that his determination calling for action upon his part was not in fact mistaken.
20(1891) 152 Mass. 540, 26 N. E. 100. See also Pearson v. Zehr, (1891)
138 Ill. 48, 29 N. E. 854; Lowe v. Conroy, (1904) 120 Wis. 151, 97 N. W.
942.
21
The declaratory judgment procedure, under the federal act, 48 Stat.
955, 28 U. S. C. A. sec. 400, Mason's U. S. Code, tit. 28, sec. 400, and in the
more than thirty states in which the Uniform Act has been adopted, see
Borchard, The Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, (1934) 18 MINNESOTA
LAW REvmW 239, has especial significance from the point of view of the
administrative officer in those situations in which immediate action is not
required. See Borchard, Declaratory Judgments ix: "The utility of thi
declaratory judgment in the adjudication of conflicting claims between the
citizen and the administration has also not been fully appreciated. It is not
merely its speed, inexpensiveness, and simplicity which commend the
declaration of rights in administrative law, nor yet the facts that it enables
disputes to be determined in their incipiency before they have grown into
devastating battles and that a decision is obtainable without the prior necessity of a purported violation of law or precarious leap in the dark. It is
rather the fact (1) that administrative officers in the performance of their
duties or in challenges to the validity of their acts require no coercive
remedies or sanctions, but merely a declaration of their legal relations, in
order to remain, or be kept, within the bounds of legality; and (2) that
the procedural vehicles by which administrative acts are submitted to
judicial review, namely, the extraordinary legal remedies and injunctions,
have accumulated so vast a cargo of technicalities that the citizen desirous
of challenging an administrative power or privilege finds himself frequently
engulfed in a procedural bog which bars him from his goal. Nor has the
officer under present practice any effective method of himself raising the
isszw of legality when. challenged, for he must isually await the litigating
initiative of his adversary." (Italics supplied.)
22
Unless omniscience includes the accurate prophesying of judicial error,
The possibility of the latter becomes more apparent when it is remembered
that- under the usual practice a trial or appellate court would be required
to sustain a jury verdict against the defendant officer, although convinced
by the evidence of a balance of probabilities in favor of the officer's own
original determination. See Wallace v. Feehan, (Ind. App. 1932) 181 N. E.
862, 867.
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communication and closeness of interdependence between communities have raised problems of health and safety that permit of
no delay in their solution, and wherein the public disaster likely
to result from mistaken nonaction or overcaution may prove
calamitous. From the point of view of the public interest, most
people, including courts and lawyers, would now agree that as
between two evils it is less serious that personal and property
rights be interfered with, even though mistakenly and unnecessarily as shown by judicial hindsight, than that whole communities be decimated by disease as the consequence of overcautious
23
administrative foresight.
At the same time that modem economic, industrial, technological, and social forces have increased the complexity of the
problems with which governments have to deal, and largely as
the consequence thereof, modern public law evolution has tended
more and more to thrust upon the administrative branch a fusion
of the threefold governmental functions. 24 As the number of administrative officers and tribunals has multiplied and the scope of
their activities enlarged, their function has ceased to be in any
exclusive sense a mechanical law-applying one,2" and has come
23
Compare Beeks v. Dickinson County, (1906) 131 Iowa 244, 248-249,
108 N. W. 311, 312-313: "It is the modern tendency of judicial opinion
Whole
to hold that the public health is the highest law of the land....
communities have been exposed and suffered because of mistakes in judgment and over-caution for the liberty of the individual ;" Raymond v. Fish,
(1883) 51 Conn. 80, 96-97: "In such cases there is absolute necessity for

immediate action.

There is no time to resort to the courts to determine

whether the supposed nuisances are so in fact, and are destroying life and
health in the vicinity. During such delay an entire village might become
depopulated." In Board of HIealth v. Court of Common Pleas, (1912) 83
N. J. L. 392, 395, 85 Atl. 217, 218, in reversing an order granting a judicial
trial de novo in the prosecution of one Montenecourt for having violated a
quarantine imposed by the board of health, the court pointed out: "To assume that the Legislature intended to confer a review of a discretionary power
of this character, vested in a statutory board, charged with its exercise in
critical situations, involving detriment to the life and health of a community, is tantamount to a declaration that the police power of the state
and useless."
is moribund
24
It is believed that the effect of the decisions in Panama Refining Co.
v. Ryan, (1935) 293 U. S. 388, 55 Sup. Ct. 241, 79 L. Ed. 446, and Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, (1935) 295 U. S. 495, 55 Sup. Ct. 837, 79
L. Ed. 1570, will not be to call a halt to this tendency of fusion so long as
reasotiably specific standards are provided as conditions of delegation, and
so long as there is adherence to fundamental "judicial" safeguards, such as
a fair hearing and reasonably specific fact-findings, in the administrative
exercise of delegated power. See also, St. Joseph Stockyards Co. v. United
States, (1936) 298 U. S. 38, 56 Sup. Ct. 720, 726, 80 L. Ed. 1033; Southern
Ry. Co. v. Virginia, (1933) 290 U. S. 190, 198, 54 Sup. Ct 148, 151, 78 L.
Ed. 260; Morgan v. United States, (1936) 56 Sup. Ct 906.
25If it ever was strictly such, see Brown, Administrative Commissions
and the Judicial Power, (1935) 19 MxNNcsoTA LAw REVIw 261, 267-268:
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to involve law-declaratory and adjudicatory aspects to almost as
great an extent as the judicial function itself. 26

One of the most

significant features of the administrative development that has
taken place has been the substitution, for the determination of
complicated problems of fact and policy involving expert knowledge, of specialized tribunals "appointed by law and informed by
experience ''27 for the less specialized judge and lay jury of the
courts of general original jurisdiction.
On the other hand, the multiplication of administrative authorities and mushroom expansion of their activities involve the
inevitable tendency of bureaucracy to reach out ever for more
power, and offer temptations and opportunities for the play of the
sadistic impulses and extreme addiction to technicalities so
frequently noticeable in small men when placed suddenly in positions of authority and power, without the professional traditions
behind them that in the case of judges have served as such a
strong restraining influence. To the extent necessary to curb
such tendencies the injection into administration of some lay influence through the medium of damage suits with their accompanying visitation of personal consequences upon the officer whose
action is challenged, no doubt appears to many to be still worth
preserving alongside the nontortious forms of judicial controland with added reason in those situations wherein the latter are
wholly lacking.
Judges of superior courts of the regular judicial hierarchy,
acting within the judicial function, have always formed a category
"... it is sometimes held that an act is administrative or ministerial rather
than judicial because it lacks in discretionary quality and calls merely for
the ascertainment of facts and the almost automatic application of the law
thereto. .

.

. This is certainly unsatisfactory. The character of an act

claimed to be judicial certainly cannot be determined by the ease or difficulty of the case to be decided; ... "
26
See Blachly and Oatman, Administrative Legislation and Adjudication, 1-42. The action of many administrative tribunals, particularly the
public service commissions, is in fact much more "legislative" in character
than "judicial," see Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry., (1908) 211 U. S.
210, 226, 29 Sup. Ct. 67, 69, 53 L. Ed. 176; but because of the extent to
which the courts have imposed "judicial" processes upon administrative
action even when primarily "legislative" in character, see St. Joseph Stockyards Co. v.'United States, (1936) 298 U. S.38, 56 Sup. Ct. 720, 726, 80
L. Ed. 1035; Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, (1935) 293 U. S. 389, 431-433,
55 Sup. Ct. 241, 253-254, 79 L. Ed. 446; Southern Ry. v. Virginia, (1933)
290 U. S. 190, 198, 54 Sup. Ct. 148, 151, 78 L. Ed. 260; Morgan v. United
States, (1936) 56 Sup. Ct. 906, the analogy to the judicial function is the
one that
is most emphasized in the text.
27
McKenna, J., in Illinois Central Ry. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, (1907) 206 U. S. 441, 454, 27 Sup. Ct. 700, 704, 51 L. Ed. 1128.
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of absolute privilege, even for conduct dictated by malice.2
following reasons for so sweeping a rule of immunity may be suggested: (1) The saving to the public of the drain upon judicial
time that would otherwise be necessitated for the defense of
private litigation ;30 (2) The prevention of undue influence upon
judicial determinations through the threats or even the possibility
of subsequent damage suits based thereon;31 (3) The fear that
men of property and responsibility might otherwise be deterred
from judicial service ;32 (4) The especial importance of an independent judiciary in the American federal and state constitutional systems;33 (5) The need somewhere of absolute finality in
the litigation of controversies, along with the practical difficulties
and lack of adequate criteria in subjecting judicial determinations
2
9Chancellor Kent, in Yates v. Lansing, (1810) 5 Johns. (N.Y.) 282,
291, 298, refers to the "doctrine which holds a judge exempt from a civil
suit or indictment, for any act done, or omitted to be done by him," as a
"sacred principle" with a "deep root in the common law." "The rule
extends to judges from the highest to the lowest, to jurors, and to all public
officers, whatever name they may bear, in the exercise of judicial power."
Weaver v. Devendorf, (1846) 3 Denio (N.Y.) 117, 120. See also Phelps v.
Sill, (1804) 1 Day's Cases in Error (Conn.) 315, 329; Chamberlain v. Clayton, (1881) 56 Iowa 331, 334, 9 N. W. 237, 238; Stewart v. Cooley, (1877)
23 Minn. 347, 350; Maelady v. South St. Paul Stock Exchange, (1919)
142 Minn. 194, 196, 171 N. W. 806, 807.
302 Cooley, Torts, 4th ed., 424.
31
See Stewart v. Case, (1893) 53 Minn. 62, 67, 54 N. W. 938: "Protection is not extended to the judge for his own sake, but because the public
interest requires full independence of action and decision on his part, uninfluenced by any fear or apprehension of consequences personal to himself,
except in so far as he may be accountable to the state for the manner in
which he shall discharge the duties intrusted to him ;" Stewart v. Cooley,
(1877)

23 Minn. 347, 350:

".

.

. so that he may feel free to act upon his

own convictions
;" Harper, Torts, 667-668.
32 Phelps v. Sill, (1804) 1 Day's Cases in Error (Conn.) 315, 329: "No
man would accept the office of judge, if his estate were to answer for every
error in judgment, or if his time and property were to be wasted in litigations with every man, whom his decisions might offend."
33
Yates v. Lansing, (1810) 5 Johns. (N.Y.) 282, 298: "Whenever we
subject the established courts of the land to the degradation of private
prosecution, we subdue their independence, and destroy their authority;"
Stewart v. Cooley, (1877) 23 Minn. 347, 350: "An independent judiciary is
justly regarded as essential to the public welfare and the best interests of
society." In fact a plausible argument might be made that the judicial
immunity is a constitutional as well as a common law principle, from the
analogy of the reasoning in Evans v. Gore, (1920) 253 U. S. 245, 40 Sup.
Ct. 550, 64 L. Ed. 887, holding the salaries of judges of the "constitutional"
courts exempt from income taxation by virtue of the provision of the third
article of the United States constitution that their compensation "shall not
be diminished during their Continuance in Office ;" see also O'Donoghue v.
United States, (1933) 289 U. S. 516, 53 Sup. Ct. 740, 77 L. Ed. 1356, and
compare Williams v. United States, (1933) 289 U. S. 553, 53 Sup. Ct. 751,
77 L. Ed. 1372 (Court of Claims not a constitutional court in this sense)
and see Note, (1933) 47 Harv. L. Rev. '133.
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to such a form of collateral attack ;34 (6) The existence of
adequate opportunities for change of venue, new trial, or reversal
on account of prejudice or error, thereby minimizing the need, as
against judges not of last resort, of an additional tort liability;-s
(7) The theory advanced by Cooley that judges in their exercise
of the judicial function are under no duty, the first requisite of a
private action, to the individual litigants before them, but are
rather under a duty owing only to the public collectively and sanctioned sufficiently by the criminal law and the impeachment or
removal power;36 (8) The mere possibility arising from the fact
that judges, as the ones administering tort liability, have at least
had no reason for being unfriendly toward their own immunity ;37
and (9) Underlying the whole principle of immunity, the feeling
not always articulately expressed that it would be manifestly
unfair for the law to place one in a position the very significance
of which is to require his opinion and accord it especial deference
in the matter in hand, and yet at the same time to penalize him
with personal consequences by reference to the opinion of another
or others in regard to the same matter."
A view that malice is so incompatible with the judicial func34"Such civil responsibility . . . would open each case to endless controversy ....
And it is to be borne in mind-that if one judge can be tried
for his judgment, the one who presides on the trial may also be tried for

his, and thus the process may go on until it becomes intolerable." 2 Cooley,

Torts, 4th ed., 425.
35
Such a reason for the immunity loses most of its force in commonwealths, such as Massachusetts at the time of the Sacco-Vanzetti trial, so
backward as to confine the power to grant a new trial on account of prejudice
to the trial judge against whom prejudice is charged, see Morgan's review of
Ehrmann, The Untried Case, (1934) 47 Harv. L. Rev. 538, 546.
3
6Cooley, Torts, 1st ed., 380.
Compare Sweeney v. Young, (1925) 82
N. H. 159, 163, 131 Atl. 155, 158: "Their obligation to do justice being
owed to the state rather than to the parties coming before them, malice
gives the parties no more right to sue them than an honest error subjecting
the act to reversal."
87Compare Brown, Administrative Commissions and the Judicial
Power, (1935) 19 MINNESOTA LAW RE IEw 261, 288, in reference to the
tendency of courts to hold that disbarment, in contrast to the other instances
of the revocation of professional licenses, is a strictly judicial prerogative
within the separation of powers principle: "Whether this is because, as the
courts have declared, the admission and disbarment of attorneys is a tradi-

tional and peculiar prerogative of the courts or whether it is because the
judges, as members of the legal profession, have a greater understanding
and sympathy for the rights of an attorney charged with unprofessional
practices may perhaps be left to conjecture."
88As expressed in National Surety Co. v. Miller, (1929) 155 Miss.

115, 123, 124 So. 251, 253, "a matter within his jurisdiction and about
which he is called on to decide under the law and the facts, in which he

is to pass judgment, in other words, is to adjudge the issue one way or
another."
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tion as to deprive determinations imbued with it of their official
character appears never to have been urged at all seriously as a
possible basis for an exception to the judicial privilege.3 9 The
cumulative effect of the suggested reasons for the immunity, rejecting as entirely inadequate only the seventh and eighth, would
appear sufficiently to justify its inclusion of malice, in that malice,
equally with any other basis of liability, is subject to the vagaries
of proof and capable of fictitious allegation in purely vexatious
suits infringing upon judicial time, impartiality, independence, and
finality. "0 In this connection the dangers of vexatious suits are
20See Anderson v. Park, (1881) 57 Iowa 69, 71-72, 10 N. W. 310, 311:
"Where a judicial or other officer does no more than what the law requires
him to do, it is immaterial, so far as his legal liability is concerned, in
what state of mind he does it:'In this case malice on the part of the
judge in committing the defendant in a criminal trial was held to have
been immaterial, since the law required committal so long as the defendant
himself took no steps to stay sentence. But it involves a further step to say
that malice is immaterial when because of it the judicial power is admittedly
exceeded. In Sweeney v. Young, (1925) 82 N. H. 159, 164, 131 Atl. 155,
158, the action was for damages against the members of a school board for
the malicious expulsion of a student. The governing statute authorized expulsion only for gross misconduct, and it was conceded that the misconduct
was not gross. In affirming a directed verdict in favor of the defendants,
the court stated that "Malice of itself as a state of mind is not a wrong for
which the law gives redress.... Since the plaintiff's dismissal is to be here
treated as violating none of his rights, it follows that the manner or means
by which the dismissal was brought and the reasons for it were not injurious. They cannot be treated separately and as distinct from the result."
It is submitted that such reasoning proves immunity for malice only by assuming that because of the immunity for malice there was no wrong.
In Stewart v. Cooley, (1877) 23 Minn. 347, 350, the action was against
the municipal court judge of Minneapolis for having maliciously conspired
to charge the plaintiff with perjury. An order sustaining a demurrer was
reversed on the ground that the complaint charged the institution of the
conspiracy prior to the commencement of the judicial prosecution, and that
therefore the defendant's conduct had not been "in the course of any judicial
proceeding, or in the discharge of any judicial function." But the decision
has been adversely criticized, see Cooley, Torts, 1st ed., p. 412, note 5, on
the ground that the conspiracy alone would have caused no injury without
the "judicial" concurrence of the defendant in the issuance of process. But
see also Melady v. South St. Paul Stock Exchange, (1919) 142 Minn.
194, 198, 171 N. W. 806, 807, 808, holding the "quasi judicial" committee of
the Stock Exchange individually immune from liability for having maliciously expelled the plaintiff from membership, but suggesting the possibility of
liability for malice had the defendants "begun and conducted the prosecution and decided it as well" instead of having merely decided it.
4oCompare Sweeney v. Young, (1925) 82 N. H. 159, 164-165, 131 Atl.
155, 158: "Whether the judicial act is reasonable or not bears on the probabilities of malice, and it therefore becomes a subject of collateral consideration in passing on the issue of malice;" Field, J., in Bradley v.
Fisher, (1871) 13 Wall. (U.S.) 335, 348, 20 L. Ed. 646: "Few persons
sufficiently irritated to institute an action against a judge for his judicial
acts would hesitate to ascribe any character to the acts which would be
essential to the maintenance of the action;" Mechem, Public Officers 427:
".. . if the action can be maintained by the allegation of improper motives,
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thought to be sufficient to require immunity from substantiated
and successful ones as well."' To the extent that "judicial" wrongdoing is irremediable otherwise, as by appeal or writ of error or
the extraordinary remedies, the possibility of a wrong without a
remedy, required by the above considerations of practicability and
42

public interest, results.

The same absolute immunity extends to legislators,43 and is
frequently said to extend to the highest executive officers of the
federal and state governments by reason of the especial dignity
of their positions.44 In connection with the power of courts to
direct their extraordinary remedies against such officers, the apparently growing tendency is to place the emphasis upon the nature
of the particular act or duty sought to be compelled, restrained,
or reviewed, rather than upon the especial dignity of the defendant's
official position, or upon the demands of courtesy to a co-ordinate
department, or upon fear of infra-governmental friction or of
inability to enforce the court's decree. 45 It is believed that in the
no litigant will fail to allege that they existed, and the public officer may
constantly be called upon to defend himself from actions at law brought
with motives fully as malicious as those which are asserted to have inspired
41 him."
See Harper, Torts, 667-668.
42 Compare Stone, J., dissenting in United States v. Butler, (1935) 297
U. S. 1, 56 Sup. Ct. 312, 325, 80 L. Ed. 1033: ".

.

. the only check upon

our own
exercise of power is our own sense of self-restraint."
43
The "legislative" immunity is generally expressly embodied in provisions of the federal and respective state constitutions. United States
constitution, art. 1, sec. 6; Minnesota const., art. 4, sec. 8. The "legislative"
immunity, as well as the immunity of executive officers for acts strictly
within their "executive" powers, has been thought to be embodied also
in the
separation of powers principle, see Mechem, Public Officers 393-394.
4
4See Harper, Torts 667. The cases Harper cites involve primarily the extraordinary remedies rather than liability in tort, with the exception of
Spaulding v. Vilas, (1895) 161 U. S.483, 16 Sup. Ct. 631, 40 L. Ed. 780,
which held there was no liability for language contained in an official communication, but otherwise laid down no sweeping rule of immunity. In Livingston v. Jefferson, (C.C.Va. 1811) 1 Brock. 203, 4 Hughes 606, Fed. Cas. No.
8,411, a demurrer to an action against Thomas Jefferson, brought after he
had ceased to be president, on account of a trespass alleged to have been
committed while president, was sustained on the ground of the local character
of the cause of action. If it is the value of official time that is of particular
significance in the case of high executive officers of state and nation, a
distinction might well be drawn between actions commenced during the defendant's term of office, and actions brought afterwards, for alleged misconduct while in office. An action was pending at the time of his death
against the late Governor Olson of Minnesota, for damages occasioned by
his use of troops in closing a factory during labor troubles; and a demurrer
to the complaint had been overruled.
45
See Cooke v. Iverson, (1909) 108 Minn. 388, 393, 122 N. W. 251-253;
State ex rel. Kinsella v. Eberhart, (1911) 116 Minn. 313, 314-320, 133 N. W.
857-860; Kumm, Mandamus to the Governor in Minnesota, (1924) 9 MINNEsoTA LAW REvIEW 21; Notes, (1930) 14 MINNESOrA LAW REVIEW 303,
572; (1935) 19 MINNESOTA LAW Rxvmrw 481.
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main the same consideration should determine the liability of such
officers to actions for damages, at least to the extent of precluding
the laying down of any absolute rule of immunity."
There are necessarily those key positions in government in
which the incumbent for reasons of both policy and politics is
permitted as to certain matters and for the time he is in office
to exercise an uncontrolled personal discretion. 47 The only sanction against abuse must be political rather than legal. In this
sense "executive" discretion is of much wider and more arbitrary

significance than "judicial" discretion, which usually suggests at
most a "legal" discretion controllable by legal processes.4" To
the extent that policy-determining administrative authorities possess a discretion of an "executive" or frequently "legislative"
character," they must necessarily be free of liability for the exercise thereof, not because of any rule of immunity attached especially to their positions, but essentially because of the complete
absence of any adequate criteria by which to determine that their
exercise of such a discretion in a particular way was "legally"
wrongful. ' To the extent, however, that courts have imposed
legal controls upon administrative processes, administrative discretion must necessarily mean something less than executive or
legislative discretion in the political sense; and the present discussion is concerned primarily with the question of liability for
'See 2 Cooley, Torts, 4th ed., p. 389.
47 See, generally, Finkelstein, Judicial Self-Limitation, (1924) 37 Harv.
L. Rev. 338; Finkelstein, Further Notes on Judicial Self-Limitation, (1925)
39 Harv. L. Rev. 229; Weston, Political Questions, (1925) 38 Harv. L.
Rev. 296; Field, The Doctrine of Political Questions in the Federal
Courts, (1924) 8 MINNESOTA LAW REvIEw 485.
4"For example, when the governor of a state is empowered to remove
a subordinate elective officer for "malfeasance or nonfeasance in the performance of his official duties," see 2 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., sec. 6954,
whether to proceed at all in the exercise of his removal power is held to be
a matter committed to the governor's "executive" discretion, so that a
court may not by mandamus compel him to do so. See State ex rel. Birkeland v. Christianson, (1930) 179 Minn. 337, 229 N. W. 313. But as soon
as the governor has decided upon action rather than non-action, and so
far as his removal power is subject to limitation by the terms of the statute,
his discretion in the exercise of it has become essentially "judicial" in character and therefore subject to control by certiorari. See State ex rel.
Kinsella v. Eberhart, (1911) 116 Minn. 313, 133 N. W. 857.
'"See note 26 supra.
-'The statement in the text does not sufficiently explain the immunity
for an unconstitutional exercise of delegated legislative power. Perhaps
the best explanation is that such action in its legislative aspects is void,
and cannot directly affect personal or property rights without losing its
exclusively legislative character, by passing into the realm of administration,
either by the same or other officers, whose liability is therefore to be determined by other principles than that of legislative immunity.
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the exercise of administrative powers which in their direct impact
upon the personal and property rights of private individuals may
be assumed to be subject to ascertainable legal limits that have
been exceeded. It is therefore directly from the analogy of the
judicial immunity that the problem is approached; and the reasons
suggested as the basis of the judicial immunity should have some
direct bearing throughout the ensuing discussion.
I.

LIABILITY FOR "QUASI JUDICIAL"

ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION

Prior to the advent of administrative justice in its present-day
dimensions and significance, the courts had experienced little or no
difficulty in permitting administrative officers to share to a considerable extent in the judicial immunity when found "to be acting
in an essentially "judicial" or "quasi judicial"' capacity. As
5
lThe only advantage of "judicial" being "softened by a quasi," see
Holmes, J., dissenting in Springer v. Government of the Philippine Islands,
(1928) 277 U. S. 189, 210, 48 Sup. Ct. 480, 485, 72 L. Ed. 845, would seem
to be by way of paying at least lip service to the separation of powers
principle in the very process of disregarding for practical reasons its full
implications. As the meaning of "judicial power" "cannot be brought
within the ring-fence of a definition," see State ex rel. Attorney-General
v. Hawkins, (1886) 44 Ohio St. 98, 109, 5 N. E. 228, 232, accordingly the
meaning of the phrase "quasi judicial" varies with the nature of the particular problem to which its usage is addressed. As a term differentiating
the administrative from the judicial process, in order to sustain administrative action within the separation of powers principle in the very situations
in which it most closely resembles the ordinary action of courts both in its
method and in its effect on personal and property rights, the prefix "quasi"
is quite meaningless, see Brown, Administrative Commissions and the
Judicial Power, (1935) 19 MIXNESOTA LAW REVIEW 261, 265-275; and the
only satisfactory explanation of the extent to which the courts have held the
separation of powers principle not to preclude the administrative exercise
of the police power would seem to be that such power has enough vitality
to provide the procedural methods best suited to the accomplishment of its
purposes, in other words, is procedural as well as substantive. See Brown,
Administrative Commissions and the Judicial Power, (1935) 19 MINNESOTA
LAW REvmv 261, 303. As a term expressing sufficient similarity to the
judicial process to permit of court review of administrative action by the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari, the prefix "quasi" is at least useful,
and has come to mean primarily that the administrative action so sought
to be reviewed is of a type that is subject to ascertainable legal limitations
and proceeds by hearing in an essentially "judicial" manner. See Dullam v.
Wilson, (1884) 53 Mich. 392, 19 N. W. 112; State ex rel. Kinsella v.
Eberhart, (1911) 116 Minn. 313, 314-320, 133 N. W. 857-860; Minnesota
Sugar Co. v. Iverson, (1903) 91 Minn. 30, 33, 97 N. W. 454, 455; State ex
rel. Hardy v. Clough, (1896) 64 Minn. 378, 67 N. W. 202. And for the
purpose of applying the analogy of the judicial immunity to administrative
action, the prefix "quasi" has tended to mean merely the presence of a
discretionary element similar to that involved in a judicial determination,
with practically no emphasis on the element of procedural similarity to the
judicial process.
See Bishop, Noncontract Law 785, 786. The three
problems have involved entirely different considerations, and entirely different approaches. The same matter may be non-judicial in the sense of
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shown by John Dickinson, a "tendency to hold that administrative determinations were judicial in character, and that the officers
making them were protected by judicial immunity, at least when
acting in good faith and from pure motives, is conspicuous in the
cases from about 1770 to about 1870. " 52 A disposition in this connection to use "quasi judicial" as synonymous with "discretionary,"
and both alike as antitheses of "ministerial," is noticeable in the
decisions. 3 Consequently, in applying the analogy of judicial
immunity to administrative determinations, the courts tended to
emphasize not so much the presence in the latter of the fundamental "judicial" safeguards such as notice and hearing, which
were in fact generally lacking, as the presence of the characteristic, in common with judicial action, of being the means of securing a judgment on facts, law, or policy of him or them whose
opinions in the matter in hand the law has asked and to which at
least for some purposes it accords especial significance. 4
Early decisions applied the judicial analogy even to the point
of including immunity for malice. 5 In the later cases, however,
permitting it to be confided to an officer or tribunal outside the regular
judicial hierarchy, and at the same time judicial for purposes of permitting
court review by certiorari and extending to it the judicial immunity; or
it may be non-judicial in both of the first two senses and at the same time
judicial in the third. "The character of the office or tribunal does not
determine the question, but, rather, the nature of the act performed" as
applied to the problem immediately before the court. Minnesota Sugar
Co. v.2 Iverson, (1903) 91 Minn. 30, 33, 97 N. W. 454, 455.
5 Dickinson, Administrative Justice and the Supremacy of Law 44-45,
note5320.
See Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York v. Brightman, (C.C.A. 8th
Cir. 1931) 53 F. (2d) 161, 165-166; State ex rel. Funk v. Turner, (1931) 328
Mo. 604, 617, 42 S. W. (2d) 594, 598; State ex rel. Robertson v. Farmers'
State Bank, (1931) 162 Tenn. 499, 505, 39 S. W. (2d) 281, 282-283; National Surety Co. v. Miller, (1929) 155 Miss. 115, 123, 124 So. 251, 253;
Stevens v. North States Motor, Inc., (1925) 161 Minn. 345, 348, 201 N. W.
435, 436; Keifer v. Smith, (1919) 103 Neb. 675, 677, 173 N. W. 685;
Chamberlain v. Clayton, (1881) 56 Iowa 331, 333, 9 N. W. 237, 238;
Bishop, Noncontract Law 785, 786; Brown, Administrative Commissions and
the Judicial
Power, (1935) 19 MINNESOTA LAW REVmEw 261, 268-269.
54
See National Surety Co. v. Miller, (1929) 155 Miss. 115, 123, 124 So.
251, 253 ("about which he is called on to decide under the law and the
facts, in which he is to pass judgment, in other words, is to adjudge the
issue one way or another") ; Stevens v. North States Motor, Inc., (1925)
161 Minn. 345, 348, 201 N. W. 435, 436 ("duties which call for the exercise
of his judgment or discretion, as to its [the act's] propriety or the manner in
which it is to be performed"); Wilson v. Spencer, (1912) 91 Neb. 169,
171, 135 N. W. 546, 547 ("in a matter wherein it is his duty to exercise
judgment and discretion") ; Pawloski v. Jenks, (1897) 115 Mich. 275, 276277, 73 N. V. 238: "His decision on the question of the approval of the bond
of plaintiff required the exercise of judgment, and it would be intolerable
that his action be reviewed at the suit of parties claiming to be injured
thereby."
55
Stewart v. Case, (1893) 53 Minn. 62, 66, 54 N. W. 938 (assessor held
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there is a noticeable tendency at least by dicta to limit the immunity of administrative officers for quasi judicial determinations
to those rendered in good faith and from proper motives.1" The
immune from liability though alleged to have "wrongfully, unlawfully, willfully, and maliciously" overassessed plaintiff's property) : "If the rule protects such officers at all, it protects them for the same reason and to the
same extent as in the case of judges of courts;" Steel v. Dunham, (1870)
26 Wis. 393, 396-398 (members of board of tax review held immune from
liability for having "without authority, wrongfully, and with intent to injure
and oppress" increased the assessment on plaintiff's property) : "But I am
not so clear upon the question whether they ought not to be held personally
liable when they act maliciously and corruptly. But even in that case my
brethren think that, upon grounds of public policy, they ought not to be
responsible in a civil action; and I defer to their judgment. Most cogent
reasons can doubtless be rendered in support of this view of the question.
The duties which these officers are called upon to perform are frequently
most difficult, delicate and embarrassing. The public interests require that
all property not exempt should be assessed at its true value for taxation.
But many persons will resort to any expedient to prevent all their taxable
property from being assessed, or, if assessed at all, from being assessed
at its true valuation. They will deceive assessors, and intimidate and
overawe boards of equalization, if possible. If they cannot carry their points,
they are very likely to charge that the officers are acting from personal
spite and corrupt motives. And it is unquestionably true, that many timid
officers would be deterred by such persons from a proper discharge of the
duties imposed upon them . . . if they were held liable in any case to a

civil action. The bare fact that they might be harassed by a law suit would
in many.cases lead them to yield to demands which were unreasonable, and
which they ought to resist to the utmost. And hence there are the strongest
considerations, on grounds of public policy, for holding that these officers,
while performing the duties imposed upon them by this law as a board of
review, and while acting within their jurisdiction, are not liable to a civil
action in any case;" Wilson v. Spencer, (1912) 91 Neb. 169, 172-173, 135
N. W. 546, 547-548: "The mere allegation . . . that in performing work
which was clearly within the scope of his duties the officer acted maliciously,
wantonly, and unlawfully does not state an actionable wrong" (but the court
suggested that it might have been sufficient had the plaintiff set forth that
"the work was not performed for the public interest, but alone intended to
damage the plaintiff"); Weaver v. Devendorf, (1846) 3 Denio (N.Y.)
117, 120, see supra note 29; see also Sweeney v. Young, (1925) 82 N. H.
159, 164-166, 131 Atl. 155, 158, supra note 39; Kittler v. Kelsch, (1927)
56 N. D. 227, 216 N. W. 898 (prosecuting attorney not liable for malicious
prosecution because acting in quasi judicial capacity), noted (1928) 12
MINNEsoTA LAW REvIv 665.

"See Logan City v. Allen, (1935) 86 Utah 375, 380, 44 P. (2d) 1085.
1087 ("in the absence of corrupt or malicious motives"); Fidelity &
Casualty Co. of New York v. Brightman, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1931) 53 F.
(2d) 161, 165 ("unless he be guilty of wilful wrong") ; State ex rel.
Robertson v. Farmers' State Bank, (1931) 162 Tenn. 499, 505, 39 S. W.
(2d) 281, 283 ("it must appear that he acted willfully, maliciously, or
corruptly") ; Wilbrecht v. Babcock, (1930) 179 Minn. 263, 265, 228 N. W.
916 ("unless it appears that the particular acts complained of were not
only unnecessary but were done corruptly or maliciously"); Stevens v.
North States Motor, Inc., (1925) 161 Minn. 345, 348, 201 N. W. 435, 436
("unless guilty of wilful wrong") ; Roerig v. Houghton, (1919) 144 Minn.
231, 234, 175 N. W. 542, 543 (immunity limited to the "honest" exercise of
judgment) ; National Surety Co. v. Miller, (1929) 155 Miss. 115, 123, 124
So. 251, 253 ("so long as they act in good faith and from honest motives") ;
Keifer v. Smith, (1919) 103 Neb. 675, 677, 173 N. W. 685 ("in the absence
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following reasons for such a limitation may be suggested: (1)
The view that malice is incompatible with the official character
of the determination;1 7 (2) The usual entire absence of oppor-

tunity to preclude prejudiced administrative action through change
of venue, coupled with the unavailability of appeal or writ of
error and the restricted scope of the extraordinary remedies as

methods of reviewing administrative action;58 and (3)

The fact

of malice, oppression in office, or willful misconduct"); Hipp v. Ferrall,
(1917) 173 N. C. 167, 169, 91 S. E. 831, 832 ("unless they act corruptly
and of malice"); Beeks v. Dickinson County, (1906) 131 Iowa 244, 247249, 108 N. W. 311, 312 ("providing there be no malice or wrong motive
present" or "gross negligence amounting to malice"); Chamberlain v.
Clayton, (1881) 56 Iowa 331, 334, 9 N. W. 237, 238 ("unless the act complained of be wilful, corrupt, or malicious") ; Adams v. Schneider, (1919)
71 Ind. App. 249, 255, 124 N. E. 718, 720 ("in the absence of corrupt motives"). In Hale v. Johnston, (1918) 140 Tenn. 182, 197-198, 203 S. W.
949, 953, it is suggested that the rule whereby an officer whose powers "are
discretionary, and to be exerted or withheld according to his own judgment,
* . . is not liable to any private
person for a neglect to exercise those
powers, nor for the consequences of a willful exercise of them, where no
corruption or malice can be imputed to him, . . . goes no further than to
relieve public officials of liability for nonfeasance and for the misfeasance
of their servants or agents." For the tort of "oppression in office," which
requires malice but not the absence of probable cause as in malicious
prosecution, see Miller v. Runkle, (1908) 137 Iowa 155, 114 N. W. 611.
5T
7 But compare Sweeney v. Young, (1925) 82 N. H. 159, 163-165, 131
Ati. 155, 158 (facts stated supra note 39): "The public interest that public
officers shall be 'free and fearless' in the exercise of their judicial duties
makes it of immaterial bearing on their liability for their judicial acts
whether or not they act from good motives. . . . Judicial acts do not lose
their character as such because malice induces them, and it is not of
consequence whether the act is free from error or irregularity, except for
the malice, or whether there is involved some error or irregularity in addition to the malice, and, if so, whether or not the malice accounts for it.
* . . Whether the judicial act is reasonable or not bears on the probabilities
of malice, and it therefore becomes a subject of collateral consideration in
passing on the issue of malice. Tribunals other than those intended by
legislation would thus be called upon to pass upon questions for which
their qualifications are ordinarily doubtful. . . . That a jury is better fitted
to pass upon an educational question when the honesty and good faith of
the committee is made an issue is hardly to be maintained. Entire independence of school boards in their judicial action is as desirable and important in the public interest as the independence of judges of courts."
58Compare Brinkley v. Hassig, (C.C.A. 10th Cir. 1936) 83 F. (2d)
351, 356-357 (proceeding to enjoin revocation by state board of medical
license) : "The principal contention . . . is that the members of the board
were prejudiced against appellant before the hearing started, and that some
of them were active in instigating the complaint. . . . The spectacle of an
administrative tribunal acting as both prosecutor and judge has been the
subject of much comment, and efforts to do away with such practice have
been studied for years ....
But it has never been held that such procedure
denies constitutional right. . . . Assuming such preconceived prejudice,
what is the answer? The statute provides but one tribunal with power to
revoke a doctor's license, just as the Supreme Court of Kansas is the only
body with power to disbar a lawyer. If such powers may not be exercised
if the members of the board or court are prejudiced, then any lawyer or
doctor who commits an offense so grave that it shocks every right-thinking
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that, of the reasons suggested for the judicial immunity, the
fourth and eighth are here absent and the first and fifth not so
compelling in the case of administrative action, at least in the
minds of judges, as to require immunity for malice.5 9 Otherwise,
the second and third reasons advanced to sustain the immunity of
judges, are of almost equal significance as applied to the determinations of administrative officers, and are the ones most frequently given for the immunity that is extended to them.60
person, has an irrevocable license to practice his profession if he can get
the news of his offense to the court or board before the trial begins....
From the very necessity of the case has grown the rule that disqualification
will not be permitted to destroy the only tribunal with power in the
premises. If the law provides for a substitution of personnel on a board or
court, or if another tribunal exists to which resort may be had, a disqualified member may not act. [See Minnesota, Laws 1929, ch. 57, sec. 13;
ch. 299, sec. 11; ch. 388, sec. 11; Stockwell v. Township Board, (1871) 22
Mich. 341.] But where no such provision is made, the law cannot be nullified
nor the doors to justice barred because of prejudice or disqualification of a
member of a court or an administrative tribunal." See Blachly and Oatman, Administrative Legislation and Adjudication 241, 242, for a criticism
of this
59 common feature of administrative action.
Though compare Sweeney v. Young, (1925) 82 N. H. 159, 164-166,
131 Atl. 155, 158, supra notes 39, 40, 57.
60
See National Surety Co. v. Miller, (1929) 155 Miss. 115, 123, 124
So. 251, 253: ". .. when we create boards and commissions and invest them
with high duties and powers towards the accomplishment of great public
objects, if we are to subject them to actionable liability for errors of decision
and judgment and cast their estates in ruin, although they act within their
jurisdiction and in good faith, we will have only insolvents in office, or else
those who will be so fearful of disaster to their private fortunes and the
safety of their families that the rule of their conduct will be that of nonaction or of action so feeble and halting and cautious, their performances so
paralytic of the vigor of decision, that they would become little more than
objects of commiseration and at last of contempt;" Stewart v. Case, (1893)
53 Minn. 62, 67, 54 N. W. 938: "If they [assessors] were liable to have the
considerations upon which they make the valuations impeached at the suit
of every dissatisfied property owner, it is doubtful if men fit to hold the
office could be induced to take it;" Wilson v. Spencer, (1912) 91 Neb. 169,
171, 135 N. W. 546, 547: "This rule is particularly applicable to officers in
control of highways, for the reason that their operations touch the property
of so many persons that, if not exempt, they might be constantly harassed ;"
Melady v. South St. Paul Stock Exchange, (1919) 142 Minn. 194, 197, 171
N. W. 806, 807: "When one of the purposes of an incorporated association
is to arbitrate controversies between its members, the board or committee
of arbitration is a quasi-judicial body within the spirit of this rule ;" Roerig
v. Houghton, (1919) 144 Minn. 231, 175 N. W. 542 (denial of building
permit) ; Chamberlain v. Clayton, (1881) 56 Iowa 331, 9 N. W. 237 (refusal of board of trustees of state school to permit teacher to enter upon
employment); Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York v. Brightman, (C.C.A.
8th Cir. 1931) 53 F. (2d) 161 (bank examination by state banking commissioner) ; Keifer v. Smith, (1919) 103 Neb. 675, 173 N. W. 685 (issuance by
stallion registration board of pedigree papers for a stallion that turned out
to be a grade); Pawloski v. Jenks, (1897) 115 Mich. 275, 73 N. W. 238
(refusal of city council to approve plaintiff's liquor bond).
It has been said that "the legal principle underlying the recognition of
the officer's liability and the right to enforce it remains the same, whether
the suit be brought by a taxpayer on behalf of the injured public board, or
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Owing to a combination of historical with constitutional factors,
the "quasi judicial" immunity so developed ran head-on into a
conception of "jurisdictional facts" and into the prevailing
judicial absolutism when dealing with property rights of a tangible
character. Because administrative tribunals in their judicial
aspects could be regarded as courts only in the "inferior" sense,,"
no "presumption" of jurisdiction attached to their determinations;
and procedural modes, when imposed by the empowering statute,
became a measure of administrative power, in other words "jurisdictional.16 2 Starting with a special capacity theory of delegated
powers, 3 the courts regarded as not done officially that which there
was no authority to do; and at a time when notice and hearing and
an orderly process of fact-finding embracing a substantial minimum
of the "judicial" safeguards had not yet become fairly defined
attributes of administrative action, it was therefore perfectly
natural for a court to conclude that an authority to destroy animals
infected with glanders could not justify the destruction of animals
honestly and reasonably though mistakenly believed to be so
by plaintiff as an individual, to redress his private wrong." First Nat'l
Bank of Key West v. Filer, (1933) 107 Fla. 526, 533, 145 So. 204, 207.
But in the case of officers administering public funds, even where acting in
a clearly quasi judicial capacity, there is a tendency to talk in terms of a
trust relation for purposes of determining liability to the public, see Twitchler
v. Bergeson, (1932) 185 Minn. 414, 417, 241 N. W. 578, 580 (defendant
member of school board held liable in taxpayer's action to account personally
for moneys improperly expended for the purchase of real estate without
authorization by popular vote, and for excess over reasonable cost of purchase price of other items) : ". . . appellant, by so voting for such expenditures, violated the trust imposed upon him by law an(. became personally
liable for the money wrongfully expended;" Land, Log & Lumber Co. v.
McIntyre, (1898) 100 Wis. 258, 262, 75 N. W. 964, 969-970.
61"Where courts of special and limited jurisdiction exceed their powers,
the whole proceeding is coram non judice, and all concerned in such void
proceedings are held to be liable in trespass. (Case of the Marshalsea,
(1614) 10 Co. 68. Terry v. Huntington, Hardres, 480.)" Chancellor Kent,
in Yates v. Lansing, (1810) 5 Johns. (N.Y.) 282, 290.
62Stuart v. Palmer, (1878) 74 N. Y. 183, 188; Stiles v. Municipal
Council of Lowell, (1919) 233 Mass. 174, 182-183, 123 N. E. 615, 616.
63See Dickinson, Administrative Justice 'and the Supremacy of Law
307-308: "The law of court review of administrative determinations has
been infected with a hidden confusion by the transformation which has
quietly shifted the emphasis of so much executive action to the function of
adjudication. The earlier law of review . .. took its starting-point from
the principle of ultra vires; so that review became focused on the issue of
jurisdiction or extent of authority, instead of appearing openly in the guise
of a proceeding in error to correct an adjudication by an inferior tribunal.
... The ultra vires theory of review co perated with American constitutional doctrine to present the review proceeding as a proceeding essentially
collateral in character. The typical form of such collateral review is the
traditional tort action for damages against an officer who has exceeded his
authority."
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infected.64 For the "taking"65 of any form of private property
required at least due process of law, which in turn called for
notice and hearing and the "ordinary decencies" of judicial procedure; and a court was unable to presume that enough of these
to satisfy due process had been had before the administrative
officer or tribunal.
Logically the only conclusion of such a process of reasoning
is that in the administrative exercise of the state's police power
a correct decision on the merits is in nearly every case a "jurisdictional" fact;66 and the extreme inversion of results thereby
64
Miller v. Horton, (1891) 152 Mass. 540, 26 N. E. 100; see also Pearson v. Zehr, (1891) 138 Ill. 48, 29 N. E. 854; Lowe v. Conroy, (1904) 120
Wis. 151, 97 N. W. 942. Compare Dickinson, Administrative Justice and
the Supremacy of Law 308-310: "Since there was no question of an oldfashioned officer like a sheriff or bailiff having held a hearing or made a
formal finding of fact preliminary to taking the action complained of, the
facts were of necessity tried by a jury in the collateral tort action-that is,
in the review proceeding itself .... In short, so long as the usual type of
executive action brought under review was not 'quasi-judicial' [in the sense
of adequate notice and hearing and reasonably specific fact-findings, see
supra note 511, it was not only natural but inevitable that the fact-finding
process should be a part of the review proceeding, and not of the administrative process itself. . . . If the right of review is rested on the theory
of ultra vires, and an administrative officer is given authority, for instance,
to destroy infected articles or diseased animals, it is possible to argue that
he is 'without jurisdiction' or authority over articles not actually infected
or over animals not really diseased. Consequently, in order to determine
the question of his 'jurisdiction,' it becomes necessary to determine in the
review proceedings these 'jurisdictional facts.'"
65At the time Miller v. Horton, (1891)
152 Mass. 540, 26 N. E. 100
was decided, the permissibility of a "taking" of private property without
compensation under the police power, as distinguished from a "taking" with
compensation under the eminent domain power, had not become so firmly
settled as it is today, and at 152 Mass. 547, 26 N. E. 102, Mr. Justice
Holmes suggested: "'When a healthy horse is killed by a public officer ...
for fear that it should spread disease, the horse certainly would seem to be
taken66for public use as truly as if it were seized to drag an artillery wagon."
Where the police power properly extends to an entire classification,
because of the known propensities of the greater number of the individual
items or members within it, as in the case of a statute requiring the disinfection of all imported rags, since the statute validly applies to all such
rags it becomes immaterial that the particular rags put through the disinfecting process were not in fact in need of it. and whether they were or
not is consequently not a "juiisdictional" fact. Train v. Boston Disinfecting
Co., (1887) 144 Mass. 523, 11 N. E. 929. "Within limits, it [the legislature]
may thus enlarge or diminish the number of things to be deemed nuisances
by the law, and courts cannot inquire why it includes certain property, and
whether the motive was to avoid an investigation. But wherever it draws
the line, an owner has a right to a hearing on the question whether his
property falls within it, and this right is not destroyed by the fact that the
line might have been drawn so differently as unquestionably to include that
property." Holmes, J., in Miller v. Horton, (1891) 152 Mass. 540, 546,
26 N. E. 100, 102. Furthermore, in most instances of the application of
the police power to the complete destruction or denial of property or other
rights, it may be assumed that the power was not intended and could not
validly have been intended, to apply in individual instances in which the
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produced was reached in the cases holding that the effect of
the absolute accountability of administrative officers for reaching
a correct decision on the merits in such matters as the abatement
of nuisances, was to dispense entirely with any constitutional
necessity for even a minimum of the "judicial" safeguards in
their conduct of the administrative proceedings.17 Taking into
consideration also the absolute character of the concepts of
trespass to realty and conversion of tangible personalty, along
with "the extension of administrative interference with individual
property rights after the middle of the nineteenth century, and
. . . the greater theoretical importance attached at the same
time to such rights,""" it becomes an understandable proposition
that "the judgment or discretion of the quasi-judicial officer,
though exercised honestly and in good faith, does not protect
him where by virtue of it, he undertakes to invade the private
property rights of others, to whom no other redress is given
than an action against the officer." 9 Or as phrased by Judge
Dillon, "The discretion which protects such an officer ...stops at
' 70
the boundary where the absolute rights of property begin.
Although the conception of "jurisdictional facts" is 'by no
means confined to the cases involving "the absolute rights of
property," 7' it is in those cases that the "boundary" where such
rights begin, and "jurisdictional facts," come together to mean one
reasons for the destruction or denial are entirely lacking. Thus it usually
may be assumed that the legislature could not validly authorize the destruction of healthy animals; nor the denial of entrance into a particular calling
or profession to one who has met all the lawful requirements for it; nor
the denial of a permit for the use of property for a lawful purpose. In all

such cases, if the argument stated in the text is pushed to its logical conclusion,
a correct decision on the merits becomes a "jurisdictional" fact.
6TPeople ex rel. Copcutt v. Board of Health of City of Yonkers, (1893)
140 N.
8 Y. 1, 35 N. E. 320.

6 Dickinson, Administrative Justice and the Supremacy of Law 46-47,

note 820.
67091echem, Public Officers 428.
71McCord v. High, (1868) 24 Iowa 336, 350.

See Stiles v. Municipal Council of Lowell, (1919) 233 Mass. 174,
182-183, 123 N. E. 615, 616. This was an action for damages against three
members of the council for having wrongfully removed plaintiff from the
offices of city treasurer and collector of taxes. The council's power to
remove the plaintiff was for "such cause as it deemed sufficient," but provided "that reasons be specifically given in writing and that the person
sought to be removed should be notified of the proposed action and furnished with a copy of the reasons." Plaintiff had been given no notice and

no copy of the reasons for his removal. The court without hesitation

affirmed a judgment in plaintiff's favor, for the reason that "The municipal
council was clothed with the power of removal of city officers so long as
there was comformity to the requirements of the law. When the members
ceased to comply with the law they were acting outside their official capacity

and were subjected to responsibility as individuals."
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and the same thing and collaborate to produce the harshest consequences. There persists a resulting distinction, as regards quasi
judicial immunity, between administrative action affirmatively
interfering with tangible property rights, and such action when
it interferes merely-with personal liberty,72 or only negatively,
as through the denial of a license or permit, with such rights
of a more intangible character as the right to enter a particular
calling or profession or to devote tangible property to a specified
use.73 Once the magic "boundary where the absolute rights of
property begin" is ascertained, or in other cases the line delimiting
"jurisdictional facts" more or less arbitrarily drawn, 7 the result
72
Compare Beeks v. Dickinson County, (1906) 131 Iowa 244, 108 N.
W. 311 (no liability for erroneous quarantine, although the statute, literally
construed, authorized the quarantine only in cases of "infectious or contagious diseases dangerous to the public"); Board of Health v. Court of
Common Pleas, (1912) 83 N. J. L. 392, 85 At. 217 (same type of case).

The greater immunity permitted in the personal liberty cases has of course
a close analogy in the law of arrest on reasonable suspicion and belief, see
Restatement, Torts, sec. 119.
73See Note, (1935) 34 Mich. L. Rev. 113.
74
For example, with Stiles v. Municipal Court of Lowell, (1919) 233
Mass. 174, 123 N. E. 615 (for facts see supra note 71), compare Jaffarian
v. Murphy, (1932) 280 Mass. 402, 183 N. E. 110, which was an action
against the mayor of Somerville for having refused to issue to plaintiff a
license to operate a miniature golf course. It was alleged that the defendant "did not exercise good faith, did not give it his fair consideration,
but was most arbitrary and capricious in exercising his discretion." This
time the same court held there was no liability, for the reason that "The
mayor's conduct in not acting in good faith and in abusing his power in a
tyrannical and unlawful manner did not affect his jurisdiction in the matter,
although it affected the validity of his decision." By the court's reasoning,
a semblance of formalities confers jurisdiction, and immunity results. But
in substance, is a proceeding in which the hearer does not exercise good
faith, does not give the evidence his fair consideration, and is arbitrary
and capricious throughout, a hearing at all? Was not the power of removal, if divorced from its method, just as much within the jurisdiction of
the council in the first case, as the power of withholding the license, by
divorcing it from its method, was held to be within the jurisdiction of the
mayor in the second case? From the point of view of all the parties concerned, considerations of fairness and justice would seem to require the
same result in both cases. And suppose that in the first case the council
had been authorized to remove "all" municipal officers on notice and full
hearing; that the council had removed the plaintiff by giving him the required notice and full hearing, with opportunity to test before them the
legality of their jurisdiction; but that in the action for damages the court
had held that he was not a "municipal" officer within the removal. statute
for the reason that he served also in a capacity as collector and custodian
of state funds (a not unlikely possibility, compare the facts of State ex rel.
Hilton v. Essling, (1923) 157 Minn. 15, 195 N. W. 539, which was not,
however, an action for damages). Here it would have been clearer still
that the council would have been acting entirely beyond its jurisdiction,
and liability would automatically follow. Yet it is believed that if such a
mistake was within the bounds of reasonable official action, the facts of the
supposed case present a far less satisfactory basis of liability than the facts
of either of the cases stated, each of which involved a violation of the single
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is liability regardless of the utmost good faith, due care, and
diligence on the one side, and immunity regardless of the
grossest negligence and frequently even malice on the other.
From the point of view both of the officer and the injured party,
the liability, if too great on the one side, is too little on the

other, and vice versa.
Analytically, and from the point of view of the administrative
officer, there is not one iota of difference in the nature of his
determination suggested by the phrase "jurisdictional facts." It
is equally a part of his public duty to make a determination of
the "jurisdictional facts" along with all other facts upon which
his authority and duty to act depend. Likewise, as between
"jurisdictional" and other facts, the classification of the fact to
be found in no way affects the character of the fact-finding operation. Consequently the proposition has been asserted that the
liability for an administrative officer's determinations of "jurisdictional facts" "depends upon his right to pass upon the jurisdictional question. ' 75 But on the one hand, how often is it to be
supposed that a quasi judicial administrative officer was not in
fact intended to have both the duty and the right of making the
initial determinations of all questions upon which his authority
to act depends ?7" And on the other hand, under the growing doctrine of the United States Supreme Court, how often does the
clearest "right" of an administrative officer or tribunal to make
the initial determinations of those questions that because of conplain meaning, so apparent that everyone who reads may understand, contained7 in the statutes upon which the powers depended.
rSweeney v. Young, (1925) 82 N. H. 159, 163, 131 AtI. 155, 157-158:
"If he goes outside his general authority, he is not protected for the
consequences of his action. If within his general authority his erroneous
exercise of it is due to special reasons of jurisdictional invalidity, he is protected. In the one case he is not called upon to act; in the other he is.
When jurisdiction is special, acts outside of it are not protected. When it
is general, all acts within it are protected.... The school board had general jurisdiction to dismiss. The general right and authority of dismissal
was vested in them, and their exercise of it was not an unwarranted act of
assumed power, but merely an erroneous exercise of actual power, for
which liability does not attach. The dismissal was a decision of a case
between the plaintiff and the school district, which the board was the duly
constituted tribunal to determine."
70Compare National Surety Co. v. Miller, (1929) 155 Miss. 115, 127,
124 So. 251, 254: "If, on this question of immunity, we shall consider
jurisdiction as no greater than legal power, then immunity disappears, and
all that the law throughout generations has said on that subject is laid aside.
For so long as officers act within their legal powers there is no occasion
for immunity. The very term presupposes error-action without or beyond
legal power .... We cannot grasp the conception that nonexistence can be
less than nonexistence, or that there can be different kinds of nonexistence,
or that that which is absent can be more absent."
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stitutional requirements or statutory interpretation are held to be
"jurisdictional, ' 77 result in the according to such determinations
of any finality in the non-tortious forms of judicial control?
The right of making a jurisdictional determination is not disconsonant with its lack of finality; and lack of finality upon
non-tortious collateral attack or review should have no directly
proportionate relation to tortious liability.7 8 Even superior courts
have no right to proceed without jurisdiction, which is a different
thing from the right of making the jurisdictional determinations ;71
and their determinations of a truly "jurisdictional" 0 character
are as open to non-tortious collateral attack with respect to both
fact and law as are the determinations of inferior courts or
administrative tribunals.8' Yet this fact was never supposed to
77See Crowell v. Benson, (1932) 285 U. S. 22, 52 Sup. Ct. 285, 76
L. Ed. 598 (issues of existence of employer-employee relationship and
occurrence of injury within interstate commerce held to require judicial trial
de novo in proceeding to enjoin compensation award rendered under the
federal Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act); Ben
Avon Borough v. Ohio Valley Water Co., (1920) 253 U. S. 287, 40 Sup.
Ct. 527, 64 L. Ed. 908 (issue of confiscation arising out of the fixing of
rates by state utility commission held to require the opportunity for an independent judicial consideration of the evidence, though limited to the record
made before the commission) ; St. Joseph Stockyards Co. v. United States,
(1936) 298 U. S. 38, 56 Sup. Ct. 720, 80 L. Ed. 1033 (same as to the fixing
of rates for the services of stockyards companies by the Secretary of Agri-

culture). To the extent that the term "jurisdictional" is used in such connections, it is believed to be practically synonymous with "constitutional,"
although the holding purports to be reached, as in Crowell v. Benson,
through statutory interpretation. However, the peculiar requirement of
Crowell v. Benson of a wholly independent judicial trial de novo, as distinguished from an independent judicial judgment upon the record prepared
by the administrative tribunal, would seem to be entirely the result of
interpretation and not of constitutional necessity.
statutory
7
SAs is more fully developed below, the availability of nontortious collateral attack upon or review of administrative determinations is more
properly a basis for dispensing with tortious liability.
7
9For example, "Prohibition will not lie against an inferior court or
the judge thereof to deprive it or him of the right to pass upon the extrinsic facts determinative of jurisdiction." Downs v. Lazzelle, (1916) 102
W. Va. 663, 668, 136 S. E. 195, 197.
8
OThat is, "jurisdictional" in the conflict of laws or "subject matter"
sense, see McClintock, Equity 57. As applied to the determinations of
superior courts the term "jurisdictional" is admittedly of narrower import
than as applied to those of "inferior" courts and administrative tribunals.
8lAnd compare the proposal that "In all actions tried without a jury,
the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions
of law thereon; . . . The findings of the court in such cases shall have the
same effect as that heretofore given to findings in suits in equity," see proposed rule 68, Preliminary Draft of Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United States and the Supreme Court of the District of
Columbia, xiii-xiv, 117-118, prepared by the Advisory Committee appointed
by the Supreme Court of the United States pursuant to the Act of Congress
of June 19, 1934, ch. 651, 48 Stat. at L. 1064. If this proposed rule is accepted by the Supreme Court, the peculiar "sting" to administrative de-
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dictional facts" "depends upon his right to pass upon the jurisdictional question" is broader than it sounds; and the inevitable
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application of the conception of jurisdictional facts, the courts
have also attempted to draw a distinction between the complete
absence of jurisdiction and a mere "excess" of jurisdiction, per-

mitting immunity for the latter. 3 It is difficult to grasp a distinction whereunder the extent to which jurisdiction is exceeded
is not by so much a complete absence of jurisdiction.8

4

Further-

terminations involved in the cases cited in note 77 supra, except the trial de
novo requirement of Crowell v. Benson, (1932) 285 U. S. 22, 52 Sup. Ct.
285, 76 L. Ed. 598 will have been largely removed; and the only "finality"
of any sort upon federal appellate review, except in the case of appeals from
the judicial determinations of state courts, will be that commensurate with
the constitutional requirement of jury trial in the cases in which it is
applicable and has not been waived.
It has been held that "jurisdiction" may be conferred upon an administrative tribunal by consent, see State ex rel. Grubbs v. Schultz, (1919) 142
Minn. 112, 171 N. W. 263.
2
8 0f course, a probate judge who should proceed to try a man criminally, to cite the instance of a possible judicial liability suggested by Field,
J., in Bradley v. Fisher, (1871) 13 Wall. (U.S.) 335, 352, 20 L. Ed. 651,
could hardly be said to have acted in his "judicial" capacity at all. But
this would not constitute a "jurisdictional" exception to his immunity-for
the example is one of such a bald "usurpation" as to have raised no genuine
jurisdictional question. Concededly the right to pass upon a jurisdictional
question presupposes the existence of a real jurisdictional question. Suppose the probate judge were equally without jurisdiction, as subsequently
held by a higher court, to continue supervision of a testamentary trust after
the settlement of an estate-would Field, J., have thought him liable for having attempted in good faith to exercise such a power?
83
Bradley v. Fisher, (1871) 13 Wall. (U.S.) 335, 352, 20 L. Ed. 651;
Calhoun v. Little, (1898) 106 Ga. 336, 342, 32 S. E. 86, 88-89; National
Surety Co. v. Miller, (1929) 155 Miss. 115, 126-127, 124 So. 251, 253-254.
Compare Bell v. McKinney, (1885) 63 Miss. 187, 191-192 (mayor, though a
"court" only in the "inferior" sense, held immune from liability for having
imprisoned a person for an offense committed entirely outside the municipality).
8
4Compare National Surety Co. v. Miller, (1929) 155 Miss. 115, 127,
124 So. 251, 254: "We cannot grasp the conception that nonexistence can
be less than nonexistence, or that there can be different kinds of nonexistence, or that that which is absent can be more absent ;" and Ballantine,
Manual of Corporation Law and Practice 276, in reference to the similar
distinction that has been drawn with regard to the ultra vires acts of private
corporations: "Whether such a distinction as this is sound admits of very
reasonable doubt. If a corporation is authorized to make a particular contract, and exceeds its power in this respect, it certainly acts without any
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more, from the point of view of the injured party, the consequences
of an excessive or abusive exercise of jurisdiction may be no less
serious than had there been a complete absence of jurisdiction;
and from the point of view of the officer, an excessive or abusive
exercise of jurisdiction through negligence or malice, to which
under the distinction as drawn liability would not attach, is
certainly more reprehensible than action taken entirely without
jurisdiction if resulting from the mistaken determination, in the
exercise of the utmost good faith, due care, and diligence, of a
difficult jurisdictional question. The results of the distinction
are frequently satisfactory; but it is neither easy of application nor sufficiently adequate as a general formula. And to the
extent that by excess of jurisdiction the courts really mean that
the action taken "was within the subject-matter of the general
jurisdiction of the board, or, again, with within the scope of the
subject-matter over which the board has general jurisdiction,","
or in other words was within the "colorable" jurisdiction of the
tribunal 5 -a meaning not entirely consonant with a distinction
between "excess" and "absence"-, does it not follow that official
liability for jurisdictional determinations is being made to depend
primarily upon their reasonableness under the circumstances?
If so, jurisdictional facts become significant in determining
official liability only in so far as they show such a clear "usurpation" of authority as a court cannot conceive of a reasonable
official in the exercise of good faith, due care, and diligence
having undertaken, and which may take the form of an abusive
or excessive exercise of jurisdiction as easily as of a complete
absence of jurisdiction. And does not this suggest the basis of a
power over the subject in so far as the excess is concerned ...a distinction,
shadowy, to say the least, between want of power on the part of the corporation and mere excess of power . . . must result, and has resulted, in
confusion and conflicting decisions. It seems absurd to say that a corporation which takes a mortgage to secure a loan, when its charter expressly
declares that it shall have the power to loan money on personal security
only, acts, not without power, but merely in excess of power, in taking the
mortgage. Making the loan is within the power of the corporation, but
taking the mortgage is as entirely beyond its actual authority as if it were
not authorized to make the loan at all."
8
5National Surety Co. v. Miller, (1929) 155 Miss. 115, 123, 124 So. 251,
253. 6
8 This follows so long as the word "jurisdictional" retains any special
administrative significance. For example, the workmen's compensation proceeding in Crowell v. Benson (1932) 285 U. S. 22, 52 Sup. Ct. 285, 76
L. Ed. 598, supra note 77, involving as it did the absence of the employeremployee relationship and of the occurrence of the injury within interstate
commerce, was not brought within the "jurisdiction" of the compensation
commissioner by virtue of the fact that it was within the "scope of the
subject-matter" of workmen's compensation.
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rule of liability that could ds easily embrace non-jurisdictional
determinations, and so eliminate entirely in the present connection
any need of a separate category for jurisdictional facts? An
attempt will be made further on to formulate such a rule.
No more significant from the officer's point of view and so
far as the characterization of his action as quasi judicial is
concerned, than the distinction as to "jurisdictional facts," is
the overlapping distinction that turns on whether his action
results in the affirmative invasion of tangible property rights.
It is believed that the absolute character of the concepts of
trespass to realty and conversion of tangible personalty should
have but a very restricted application in the law of public officers.
To say that "The civil liability of an officer committing a tort
appears to be exactly the same as that of a civilian, ' '1 7 and for
that reason to apply such concepts to him, is to depart from
the premise stated and to impose a larger liability upon the
officer than upon the civilian, for the very reason that, as already
pointed out, the law also imposes upon the officer the duty of
assuming the risk of mistaken action to an extent not true of the
civilian.
Nor is the absolute character of the concepts of trespass
to realty and conversion of tangible personalty to be regarded
as peculiarly "enshrined in the constitutions." Modern economic
organization has abundantly demonstrated that material well
being is no longer dependent upon the attachment of any especial
legal sanctity to property in the form of a part of the earth's
surface or of an otherwise tangible character; and that the
"right" to follow a particular calling, profession, or trade, already
highly susceptible of administrative disposition, or the "rights"
in the benefits of business ingenuity and in employment, may be
no less dear. And juristic development without statutory aid
has long recognized a privilege of trespass and conversion even in
private individuals whenever "it reasonably appears to the actor
to be necessary, for the purpose of averting a public disaster," 5
defined to include "conflagration, flood, earthquake or pestilence.""s
To the extent that official action is taken for the purpose of avoiding or mitigating the effects of a "public disaster" so defined, it
partakes to the same extent of the same privilege90
' 7 Silva v. MacAuley, (1933)

890.

135 Cal. App. 249, 257, 26 P. (2d) 887,

",Restatement, Torts, sec. 196 (1), comment (f).
"'Restatement, Torts, sec. 196, comment (a).
,",Restatement, Torts, sec. 202, comment (d).

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

But can it be successfully contended, without reliance on
philosophical excursions having their only proper place in political
and not in legal forums and running counter to the whole trend
of modern development, that the same preponderant public interest
thought sufficient in the enumerated instances of "public disaster"
to justify trespass and conversion even by private individuals
upon their reasonable belief in the necessity therefor, is not
also present in all the situations wherein the law has decreed
official interference with personal and property rights? Are not
nuisances, plant and animal diseases, food adulteration, and all the
manifold abuses of absolute rights that are within the legitimate
purpose of regulatory legislation under the police power to
curb in behalf of the public health, safety, and welfare, in
their totality perhaps as great or an even greater social menace
than the fewer though more dramatic instances of "conflagration,
flood, earthquake or pestilence?" The only difference must be
found in the less pressing emergency character of the situations
not amounting to an immediate "public disaster." Would not the
most accurate legal measure of this difference be secured by
restricting a privilege on reasonable belief in such situations to
official action, without otherwise restricting the nature of the
privilege?
The Restatement of the Law of Torts, after recognizing the
privilege on reasonable belief of private individuals and public
officers alike in the enumerated instances of "public disaster,"
sets forth that in the abatement by public officers of ordinary
public nuisances not amounting to a "public disaster" as defined,
"It is not sufficient that the actor reasonably believes in the
existence thereof." 9' It then sets forth the further proposition
that, in the performance of a "duty or authority imposed or created
by legislative enactment . . . to enter land in the possession of

another,"
"Since the privilege to enter the land depends upon the
existence of the duty or authority in the actor, a reasonable
belief on his part as to the existence thereof will not justify
his entry if he has in fact no such duty or authority. It may be,
however, that the authority or duty is to proceed when certain
facts are reasonably believed to exist. In this case a reasonable
but mistaken belief in the existence of the prescribed facts will
justify the entry."92
91
Sec. 202, comment (e). It is said that a private individual is not
entitled to abate a public nuisance at all unless it also constitutes a private
nuisance to the actor, see sec. 201 (1) (a) ; though compare Raymond v.
Fish,92 (1883) 51 Conn. 80, 99.
Sec. 211, comnent (e).
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Such a proposition is a convenient way of reconciling a number of apparently conflicting decisions. 3 But it is submitted that
unless a contrary interpretation is compelled by the clearest
language, the only reasonable interpretation of every statute purporting to authorize official trespass and conversion in the abatement of nuisances or for other regulatory purposes is that both
the duty and the power arise as soon as the facts conditioning
the privilege "are reasonably believed to exist.""9 Certainly the
officer's public duty then arises. And from the point of view
both of the officer and of the public interest that the performance
of his duty is designed to safeguard, is it a fair interpretation
that the power conferred is not intended to be coterminous with
the duty imposed?
It isin the administrative exercise of the police power in a
'5For example, in Miller v. Horton, (1891) 152 Mass. 540, 542, 26 N.
E. 100, the statutory authority of the board of health, if literally interpreted,
was restricted to "cases of farcy or glanders;" see also Pearson v. Zehr,
(1891) 138 Ill.
48, 51, 29 N. E. 854, 855 (authority to destroy "diseased
animals"). On the other hand, in Raymond v. Fish, (1883) 51 Conn. 80,
93, the statutory authority of the board of health specifically included "all
nuisances and sources of filth . . . which in their judgment shall endanger

the health of the inhabitants." (Italics supplied.)
04in Raymond v. Fish, (1883) 51 Conn. 80, 96-97, the court attached no
especial significance to the literal construction of the words of the empowering statute set forth in note 93: "The statute does not mean to destroy
property which is not in fact a nuisance, but who shall decide whether it is
so? . . .If the board of health are to decide at their peril, they will not decide at all. They have no greater interest in the matter than others, further than to do their duty; but duty, hampered by a liability for damages for
errors committed in its discharge, would become a motive of very little
power." In this case an accumulation of brush used in the development
and preservation of the plaintiff's oyster beds had been destroyed because of
its believed relation to a diphtheria and scarlet fever epidemic-a relation
which the trial court had found to be nonexistent. The epidemic had entirely ceased some three months before the action was taken in December
for the purpose of preventing recurrence the following summer, so that the
case can hardly be considered as one of an immediate public disaster in the
form of "pestilence" within the rule of sec. 196 (1), comment (a) of the
Restatement. What is believed to be of much significance for present
purposes is that the plaintiff had been accorded notice and full hearing in
the proceeding before the board of health.
In Wilbrecht v. Babcock, (1930) 179 Minn. 263, 228 N. W. 916, the
court apparently thought it without especial significance that the effect of
the defendant highway commissioner's action, in raising a 1% foot embankment in a way that was alleged to have been "unnecessary," was to
throw surface waters back upon the plaintiff's land.
And where no trespass to realty or conversion is involved, the courts
are entirely ready to follow the rule of construction suggested, see Beeks v.
Dickinson County, (1906) 131 Iowa 244, 108 N. W. 311 (here the authority
to quarantine against "infectious or contagious diseases" if literally construed was no greater than that in Miller v. Horton or Pearson v. Zehr,
supra note 93); and Board of Health v. Court of Common Pleas, (1912)
83 N. J. L. 392, 85 AtI. 217.
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way that directly and affirmatively affects tangible property
rights as well as rights of an intangible or personal character
that the dangers of overcaution and timidity are most apparent.
And in its application to problems calling ever more for specialized
training and expert scientific knowledge, any rule of absolute
liability based upon the "jurisdictional" character of the determination or the tangible character of the rights affected renders
to such an extent abortive the whole purpose of modern administrative development in substituting specialized administrative
tribunals for the judges of general original jurisdiction and lay
juries. Although pointing out that "No one would insist, for
instance, that a finding of the Interstate Commerce Commission,
or of a state utility commission, as to what is a reasonable rate,
or a finding of the Federal Trade Commission as to what amounts
to unfair competition, should be subjected to the verdict of a jury
on the point,""5 Dickinson also suggests that
"The desirability of such a retrial of the facts in a lawsuit,
with renewed presentation of evidence after the administrative
agency has considered the facts and has acted, may be an open
question in nuisance and health cases and certain others arising
in the field of police regulation."9 "
But as between the finding by a board of veterinaries that
particular animals directly before them are infected with glanders,
and a finding by a lay jury, peculiarly susceptible to the misuses
of expert testimony, long after the animals are dead and buried
without benefit of formaldehyde, that they were not so infected,
is not the balance of probabilities in fact very preponderantly in
favor of the accuracy of the first finding? Many have come to
believe that with the advent of modern science and technology
the superiority of the lay jury as a fact-finding body has become
a myth, and the jury itself a moribund institution as regards the
trial of civil cases generally. Without going that far, one may
yet recognize the incongruity of permitting determinations by
those supposedly best qualified to make them to be re-examined
from the ground up by an inexpert body and with consequences
97
personally disastrous to the original trier.
9
"Dickinson,
Administrative Justice and the Supremacy of Law 108-109.
96
Dickinson, Administrative Justice and the Supremacy of Law 108.
97The incongruity becomes more apparent when it is remembered that
in an appellate proceeding to review a judgment entered on a verdict against
the defendant officer, the court may be required by the usual practice to
affirm the judgment so long as the verdict in relation to the evidence in the
record was within the bounds of reason, even although the evidence definitely preponderated in favor of the administrative determination. See Wallace
v. Feehan, (Ind. App. 1932) 181 N. E. 862, 867.
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The doctrines of Ben Avon Borough v. Ohio Valley Water
Co."s and Crowell v. Benson,19 requiring an independent judicial
determination of certain constitutional or jurisdictional issues in
proceedings to enjoin administrative rate schedules and compensation awards, 10 involve neither the interposition of a jury nor the
possibility of consequences personal to those rendering the administrative determinations in controversy. The application of similar
doctrines in damage suits requires not only the same duplication
of time spent in fact-finding,'"' despite a balance of probabilities
in favor of the administrative determination having achieved a
correct result, 02 but involves an additional likelihood of injustice
to the defendant officer which in turn has been thought to disserve the public interest by cautioning too great timidity in administrative action and dissuading men of property and responsibility from serving in that capacity.103 And the back-handed
twist whereby a rule of absolute liability has been made to dispense
with any constitutional necessity of adherence to a minimum of
the "judicial" safeguards in the administrative process itself, 10
is a direct boomerang to the individual affected in his person or
property by administrative action, whose interests in more cases
than not would be found to be better secured by adequate notice
and a fair hearing, coupled with an opportunity for judicial review
by some form of proceeding in error, than by remitting him to
an original suit against a likely judgment-proof officer.
It is now settled as to most matters involving the exercise
of the police power that administrative process may satisfy due
process, provided it assures adequate notice and a fair hearing,
and provided it assures also some opportunity for judicial review
to correct errors of law and secure against arbitrary, oppressive,
or unreasonable fact-findings.102 Due process requires neither
98(1920) 253 U. S. 287, 40 Sup. Ct. 527, 64 L. Ed. 908.
g9(1932) 285 U. S. 22, 52 Sup. Ct. 285, 76 L. Ed. 598.
lo0See
note 77 supra.
0
J' Such a criticism is particularly pertinent to the trial de novo requirement of Crowell v. Benson, see note 77 supra; see also Notes, (1933) 46
Harv.02L. Rev. 478; (1932) 41 Yale L. J. 1037.
-See Hughes, C. J., in St. Joseph Stockyards Co. v. United States,
(1936) 298 U. S. 38, 56 Sup. Ct. 720, 726, 80 L. Ed. 1033: "But this
judicial duty to exercise an independent judgment does not require or
justify disregard of the weight which may properly attach to findings upon
hearing and evidence."
lO3See note 60 supra.
10 4People ex rel. Copcutt v. Board of Health of City of Yonkers, (1893)
140 N. Y. 1, 35 N. E. 320, see note 67 supra.
'OrSee Brown, Administrative Commissions and the Judicial Power,
(1935) 19 MINNEsoTA LAW REvmw 261, 265, note 11, and cases there cited.
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jury trial nor adherence to the separation of powers principle.
And by whatsoever processes of tenuous reasoning the separately
embodied jury trial and separation of powers requirements of the
federal and respective state constitutions have been avoided by
the courts in permitting the administrative exercise of the police
power, they would seem all to come down to a proposition of
according to such a power enough vitality to accomplish its purposes by the most suitable methods." 6
In other words the police power is procedural as well as substantive. As much as any man in judicial life the present chief
justice has realized the new and overwhelming significance of
the part played in modern governments by their administrative
branches, and the inevitableness of continued developments in the
same directions. 10

7

The fact of accurate perception, rather than

unfriendliness of the type displayed by less acute minds, should
account for the importance attached by him to such matters as
adequate notice and hearing and specific fact-findings in situations
in which they had never before been assumed to have any significance-as even in the case, for example, of the exercise by
an administrative officer or tribunal of permissibly delegated
legislative power-' 0 8 and at the same time to the availability of opportunities for judicial review in which a court may
substitute its own independent judgment on fundamental issues of
fact as well as of law. 09 In other words, the imposition upon
administrative processes of a substantial minimum of the "judicial"
safeguards would seem to be in reality a counterpart of recognizing their modern significance and permanence, and a method of
extending the arm of welcome into the judicial fold to brothers
'loSee Brown, Administrative Commissions and the Judicial Power,
LAW REVIEW 261, 303.
1 See the statement quoted in Frankfurter and Davidson, Cases on
Law, 1st ed., vii.
Administrative
' 0 sPanama Refining Co. v. Ryan, (1935) 293 U. S. 388, 431-433, 55 Sup.
Ct. 241, 253-254, 79 L. Ed. 446; with which compare Cardozo, J., dissenting
in*the same case, at 293 U. S. 444-448, 55 Sup. Ct. 258-260. Historically,
Cardozo, J., would seem to be on firmer ground, see Commonwealth v.
Sisson, (1905) 189 Mass. 247, 252-253, 75 N. E. 619, 621-623; but in the
light of modern conditions the majority opinion by the chief justice would
seem to be the sounder analytically. For so long as reasonably specific
standards are required as conditions of the delegation of legislative power
to administrate officers or tribunals, their exercise thereof involves not only
legislative discretion but also an essentially "judicial" determination whether
the conditions of the delegation are present, which should therefore proceed in a "judicial" manner. See also Morgan v. United States, (1936)
56 Sup. Ct. 906; Southern Ry. Co. v. Virginia, (1933) 290 U. S. 190,
198, 54 Sup. Ct. 148, 151, 78 L. Ed. 260.
'o-St. Joseph Stockyards Co. v. United States, (1936) 298 U. S. 38, 56
Sup. Ct. 720, 726, 80 L. Ed. 1033.
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at least of the half-blood-at the same time retaining for the
courts organized under the constitution an adequate degree of the
ultimate control. 11 0 Does not the attitude emanating from the
nation's highest court indicate a complete reversal of the
reasoning in People ex rel. Copcutt v. Board of Health of City

of Yonkers,'" and suggest that the protection of the interests of
the private individual against improper administrative action is to
be sought primarily and as the general rule in the administrative
process itself, as supplemented by facilities for judicial review
involving neither the interposition of a jury nor the possibility
of consequences personal to the officer whose action is challenged?

To the extent that procedure by notice and hearing with
specific fact-findings thus becomes characteristic of administrative action, such action as the general rule may be assumed to be

'quasi judicial" in the sense of facilitating review by certiorari,112

the scope of which has steadily tended to enlarge under the pressure of increased administrative activities. 1 13 As to administrative
" 0 As pointed out in note 81 supra, the "discrimination" against the
findings of administrative tribunals involved in the doctrines of Ben Avon
Borough v. Ohio Valley Water Co., Crowell v. Benson, and St. Joseph
Stockyards Co. v. United States, will have been largely removed if proposed rule 68 of the Rules of Civil Procedure for the federal courts is accepted by the Supreme Court.
111(1893) 140 N. Y. 1, 35 N. E. 320. See note 67 supra. Compare
Dickinson, Administrative Justice and the Supremacy of Law 44, 310: "To
the boards and commissions which have sprung up in recent years the
courts have applied the same methods of control which had been worked
out in the decisions dealing with the older types of public officers. . . . It
may be, and usually is, the case, however, that the very essence of the
administrative proceeding has been the determination by expert specialists
of precisely these ["jurisdictional"] facts after due notice and hearing. On
the doctrine of 'jurisdictional facts,' the determination must be made over
again, and independently, by the court or jury, in order to determine
whether the administrative agency exceeded its competence. Such a doctrine logically applied would eviscerate the whole administrative process, and
it is not applied logically; but enough of it is left to confuse very badly the
utterances
of the courts on the question of review of facts."
112 Though not in the federal courts, see Degge v. Hitchcock, (1913)
229 U. S. 162, 171, 33 Sup. Ct. 639, 57 L. Ed. 1135: "It is true that the
Postmaster General gave notice and hearing to the persons specially to be
affected by the order and that in making his ruling he may be said to have
acted in a quasi-judicial capacity. But the statute was passed primarily
for the benefit of the public at large and the order was for them and their
protection. That fact gave an administrative quality to the hearing and to
the order and was sufficient to prevent it from being subject to review by
writ of certiorari."
n"See Mitchell, J.. in Moede v. County of Stearns, (1890) 43 Minn.
312, 313, 45 N. W. 435: ". . . we have to recognize the fact that the office
of this writ has been extended beyond what it was at common law ;" and
compare the New York certiorari statute, permitting a court to determine
upon the record "whether there was, upon all the evidence, such a preponderance of proof, against the existence of any of those facts [found by
the administrative tribunal], that the verdict of a jury, affirming the exis-
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action affecting property rights, whether "quasi judicial" in this
or any other sense or not, a remedy by injunction, usually with
the opportunity for a complete trial de novo, is frequently available.1 4 To a very great extent such remedies constitute a continuation of the administrative process, albeit in judicial forums. 115
But before a rule as to tort liability that therefore assumes the
normal adequacy of the administrative process may be propounded,
account must be taken of the special considerations present in
those situations involving the protection of the public health,
safety, and welfare against emergencies in which the imperativeness of prompt action precludes both adequate notice and hearing
as well as the possibility of preventive judicial intervention; and
also of those situations in which the administrative officer is said
to be acting ministerially, as distinguished from quasi judicially
or otherwise in the exercise of discretion.
The speed of an administrative adjudication is not necessarily
opposed to the adequacy of the hearing afforded, and is one of its
aspects most worthy of judicial emulation.116 Cases of the first
type are the very ones in which it is of the utmost importance
that the officer be not influenced toward overcaution by fear of
subsequent damage suits arising out of his prompt action taken in
good faith, even though mistakenly, in the public interest. Officers
so required to act are usually medical or otherwise scientific
experts, or persons carrying out their instructions. Even though
acting ex parte or without the opportunity of a really effective
contest, there is still something of a balance of probabilities in
favor of the accuracy of their determinations. On the other
hand, the accelerating process no doubt reaches a point after
which the possibilities of error are increased proportionately by
tence thereof, . ..would be set aside by the court, as against the weight of
evidence," and to "make a final order, annulling or confirming, wholly or
partly, or modifying, the determination reviewed, as to any or all of the
parties."
New York, Civil Practice Act, secs. 1304, 1305.
114See McClintock, Equity 74.
1"5As illustrative, compare what the Supreme Court has said the "constitutional" courts may not do by way of carrying forward the "legislative"
aspects of administrative proceedings, as in Keller v. Potomac Electric
Power Co., (1923) 261 U. S. 428, 43 Sup. Ct. 445, 67 L. Ed. 731; Federal
Radio Commission v. General Electric Co., (1930) 281 U. S.464, 50 Sup.
Ct. 389, 74 L. Ed. 969; and see Federal Radio Commission v. Nelson Bros.
Bond & Mtge. Co., (1933) 289 U. S.266, 53 Sup. Ct. 627, 77 L. Ed. 1166,
with what they actually do, as in West v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone
Co., (1935) 295 U. S. 662, 55 Sup. Ct. 894, 79 L. Ed. 1640, see particularly the dissent by Stone, J., beginning at 295 U. S.680, 55 Sup. Ct.
901.
116See Stephens, What Courts Can Learn from Commissions, (1933)
19 A. B. A. Journ. 141.
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the promptness of the action taken, and in all such instances the
safeguards that inhere in the "quasi judicial" administrative
process, in the sense of notice and hearing, are entirely lacking.
Even so, the police power should have equally enough vitality in
all such instances to dispense for the same reasons with what is
virtually a form of liability without fault; and if the emergency
character of the situations dealt with, in order to dispense with
even a semblance of notice and hearing preliminary to administrative action, be required to approximate a "public disaster" within
the rule of the Restatement already considered, 17 the only question
that would be left open for a jury's determination in subsequent
suits against the officer is whether the defendant had acted
reasonably under the circumstances.

II.

"MINISTERIAL"

LIABILITY WITHOUT FAULT

The distinction between the terms "discretionary" and "quasi
judicial" on the one hand, and "ministerial" on the other, as
applied to administrative action, is one that has never been drawn
in a way fully or satisfactorily to explain the consequences, as
regards immunity for error, of the distinction. It is said that
when "the law in words or by implication commits to any officer
the duty of looking into facts, and acting upon them, not in a way
wvhich it specifically directs, but after a discretion in its nature
judicial, the functions are termed 'quasi judicial;' ,,11 and conversely, that "a duty is to be regarded as ministerial when it is a
duty that has been positively imposed by law, and its performance
required at a time and in a manner, or upon conditions which are
specifically designated.""" But it has also been pointed out that
such a statement "obviously requires some modification, as it
would be difficult to conceive of any official act, no matter how
directly ministerial, that did not admit of some discretion in the
manner of its performance, even if it involved only the driving
of a nail ;" 12- and on the other hand, "that a necessity may exist
for the ascertainment, from personal knowledge or from information derived from other sources, of those facts or conditions, upon
the existence or fulfillment of which, the performance of the act
11See
above, pp. 289-91.
118 See State v. Hastings, (1893) 37 Neb. 96, 117, 55 N. W. 774, 781,
quoting
from Bishop, Noncontract Law, 785, 786.
" 8 First Nat'l Bank of Key West v. Filer, (1933) 107 Fla. 526, 534,
145 So. 204, 207.
120 Ham v. Los Angeles County, (1920) 46 Cal. App. 148, 162, 189 Pac.
462, 468.
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becomes a clear and specific duty, does not operate to convert
the act into one judicial in its nature."'2 1 The resulting confusion
is apparent in the squarely conflicting decisions as to the nature
of identically the same types of administrative action. 2 2 It has
consequently been judicially held that the true test is whether
the law "unqualifiedly requires the doing of a certain thing. To
the extent that its performance is unqualifiedly required, it is not
discretionary, even though the manner of its performance may
be discretionary.""'
Such a statement of the distinction at least suggests a standard
capable of application, and would seem to have, the additional
happy effect of tending to obliterate the further distinction that
so many courts have drawn between ministerial misfeasance and
nonfeasance. For the latter most courts have held even ministerial
officers not to be liable, generally on the theory that the duty
to act at all is one owing only to the general public collectively
and not separately to the private individuals likely to be injured
by its omission, to whom a duty to act in a proper manner arises
only after action has been undertaken.12 4 It is believed that, the
21First Nat'l Bank of Key West v. Filer, (1933) 107 Fla. 526, 534,
145 So. 204, 207.
"?2For example, compare Fergus v. Brady, (1917) 277 Ill. 272, 275, 115
N. E. 393, 395: "The duties of the auditor and treasurer in issuing and
paying warrants are purely ministerial;" with Hicks v. Davis, (1917) 100
Kan. 4, 5-6, 163 Pac. 799: ".

.

. the functions of a state auditor are more

than those of a mere ministerial officer .. .it would do the state as well as
the auditor a great injustice to announce a rule that the auditor would
subject himself to a personal liability in every case when it was finally
adjudicated that he had erred on the side of the public by refusing to audit
and honor a questionable demand against the state .... Such duties . . .are

of too great importance and call for too much prudence, judgment and discretion to be characterized as merely ministerial." "The main perplexity
in the case of public officials .. .whose responsibilities include and blend
almost indefinably the judicial, legislative, and administrative functions, is
to determine where the.niinisterial and imperative duties end and the discretionary powers begin." Ham v. Los Angeles County, (1920) 46 Cal.
App. 148, 162, 189 Pac. 462, 468.
"'Ham v. Los Angeles County, (1920) 46 Cal. App. 148, 162, 189
Pac. 462,
468.
124 See Smith v. Iowa City, (1931) 213 Iowa 391, 395, 239 N. W. 29,
31: "The negligence, if any, of the individual members of the park board
was the failure on their part to maintain the device or instrumentality in
question in repair and in a safe condition for the use of the public; that is,
they are guilty, if at all, of nonfeasance only;" Stevens v. North States
Motor, Inc., (1925) 161 Minn. 345, 349, 201 N: W. 435, 436 (action against
county commissioners and state highway officers on account of an accident
resulting from a sharp turn in the highway that had been constructed without an incline upon the outer side of the curve, at which there had been
several accidents known to defendants. It was also alleged that defendants
had negligently permitted a log 11 feet long and 10 to 14 inches in diameter
to remain upon the highway in direct line of travel around said curve,
causing the automobile in which plaintiff was riding to overturn. In
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clear duty having been imposed, and subject to the ordinary
limitations of foreseeability, official liability may be premised
upon the consequences of wrongful nonaction as easily as of
wrongful action; and that
"It is immaterial that the duty is one primarily imposed on
public grounds, and therefore, primarily a duty owing to the
public. The right of action springs from the fact that the private individual receives a special and peculiar injury from the
neglect in performance, which
it was in part the purpose of the
2law to protect him against."'
But the distinction as stated above is far more appropriate
in determining the availability of the writ of mandamus to compel
official action than as a test of official liability;i26 and in so far
affirming an order sustaining a demurrer, the court distinguished Tholkes
v. Decock, (1914) 125 1inn. 507, 147 N. W. 648, as "a case of misfeasance
on the part of the overseer in repairing a culvert in a public highway. It
was not a case of nonfeasance like unto the case at bar. There, the overseer
undertook to repair the culvert, and while so doing went beyond his duty
in that he left a pitfall in the culvert overnight, an independent tort for
which he was personally liable, the same as would any other person, in no
way connected with the highway, have been .... It constituted misfeasance
as distinguished from nonfeasance, and therein lies a distinction between
that case and the one at bar") ; Carpenter v. Atlanta & C. A. L. Ry., (1922)
184 N. C. 400, 406, 114 S. E. 693, 696 (no liability for death from electric shock resulting from contact with asphalt tank negligently permitted
to lie in close proximity to electric wires): "For the negligent breach of
a public duty administrative, ministerial, and imposed entirely for the
public benefit, a public officer may not be held individually liable to a person
who has been injured by his negligence unless the statute creating the office
or imposing the duties makes provision for such liability ;" Hipp v. Ferrall,
(1917) 173 N. C. 167, 91 S. E.831; Thomas v. Wilton, (1884) 40 Ohio St.
516; Binkley v. Hughes, (1934) 168 Tenn. 86, 92-94, 73 S.W. (2d) 1111,
1112-1113, distinguishing Vance v. Shelby County, (1925) 152 Tenn. 141, 273
S. Mr. 557; Antin v. Union High School Dist. No. 2, (1929) 130 Or. 461,
479, 280 Pac. 664, 669-670; Adams v. Schneider, (1919) 71 Ind. App. 249,
258, 124 N. E.718, 720-721.
l2'Raynsford v. Phelps, (1880) 43 Mich. 342, 345, 5 N. W. 403; see
also Vance v. Hale, (1928) 156 Tenn. 389, 395, 2 S. W. (2d) 94, 96-97
("misfeasance in the omission of a duty placed upon him") ; Hale v. Johnston, (1918) 140 Tenn. 182, 198, 203 S.W. 949, 952-953 ("we consider it
wholly immaterial whether it be considered that the negligence of defendants
I . was misfeasance or nonfeasance ....

Inaction would none the less be a

misfeasance because they had assumed the discharge of the statutory duty,
and failure to perform a positive duty is positive wrong"), though compare
the later Tennessee case of Binkley v. Hughes, (1934) 168 Tenn. 86, 92-94,
73 S. W. (2d) 1111, 1112-1113, supra note 124; Gage v. Springer, (1904)
211 111. 200, 204, 71 N. E. 861, 862; First Nat'l Bank of Key West v. Filer,
(1933) 107 Fla. 526, 535, 145 So. 204, 207 ("where the law imposes upon
a public officer the performance of ministerial duties in which a private
individual has a special and direct interest, the officer will become liable to
such individual for any injury which he may proximately sustain in
consequence of the failure or neglect of the officer either to perform the
duty at all, or to perform it properly. In such a case the officer is liable
as well for nonfeasance as for misfeasance or malfeasance") ; Ham v. Los
Angeles County, (1920) 46 Cal. App. 148, 165-166, 189 Pac. 462, 468.
l2IThe statements so often made that certiorari is the proper remedy to
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as it entails the consequence that an officer in the performance
of his ministerial duties is required "at his peril" and "without
regard to his motives" to find correctly the facts and interpret
correctly the law "imposing a duty upon him and calling for
action on his part,'

27

it is based on no substantial difference from

which such a consequence can logically be derived. Placing all
emphasis on whether the duty involved is one that the law "unqualifiedly requires" shows the extent to which the courts have
confused executive with judicial discretion. As to the rank and
file of officers exercising administrative powers over persons or
property, it is from the judicial analogy rather than that of
executive discretion of a policy-determining or political character
that the problem of liability must be approached. And the judicial
function, as regards the litigation of controversies generally and
as the rule rather than the exception, involves no very wide scope
of discretion once the fact-finding and law-interpreting process
is ended-there is thereafter quite frequently upon judge or jury
a duty of the very type that the law "unqualifiedly requires"
and for which adequate sanctions exist.
In other words "judicial" discretion is to a very large extent
confined to the fact-finding and law-interpreting process, 28 and
review quasi judicial administrative action, and mandamus the proper
remedy to compel the performance of ministerial administrative duties, have
deceived a recent non-legal writer into making the unfounded assertion that
"The remedies of certiorari and mandamus are mutually exclusive." See
Pfiffner, Public Administration 449. Very frequently the ascertainment of
a duty that the law "unqualifiedly requires" so that the writ of mandamus
will compel its performance, involves also a proceeding quasi judicial in
character so that the writ of certiorari is equally available to review it.
For example, with State ex rel. Pete v. Eklund, (1936) 196 Minn. 216, 264
N. W. 682 (certiorari to review alleged wrongful removal of officer protected by veterans' preference law), compare State ex rel. Boyd v. Matson,
(1923) 155 Minn. 137, 193 N. W. 30 (mandamus to compel reinstatement
of officer alleged to have been wrongfully removed under veterans' preference
law). In Roerig v. Houghton, (1919) 144 Minn. 231, 175 N. W. 542, the
officer who was held not liable for having refused to issue a building permit
to the plaintiff, on the ground that his duties in that respect were quasi
judicial in character, had already been mandamused in another proceeding,
see State v. City of Minneapolis, (1917) 136 Minn. 479, 162 N. W. 477,
into issuing the permit.
' 27Reichert v. Milwaukee County, (1914) 159 Wis. 25, 36, 150 N. W.
401, 404; see also Clark v. Kelly, (1926) 101 W. Va. 650, 661, 133 S. E.
365, 369.
128By a trial court's "discretion," an appellate court usually means the
limits within which its rulings on procedural and evidential questions will be
accorded "finality;" and in this sense the word "discretion" is of course
entirely inappropriate to the law-interpreting function. But as a basis of the
judicial immunity, it is submitted that the word "discretionary" as characterizing a judicial determination applies as fully to its law-interpreting
aspect as to those of fact-finding and trial administration.
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refers to and gathers its significance from the fact that it is the
exercise of "judgment" by him or them whose opinion in the
matter in hand the law has asked and to which it therefore renders
some especial significance. "The character of an act claimed to be
judicial certainly cannot be determined by the ease or difficulty of
the case to be decided ;"' and no more in the case of administrative than of judicial action is the fact-finding and law-interpreting
process in any way simplified or rendered more mechanically lawapplying by the fact alone that it is preliminary to the ascertainment of a duty that the law "unqualifiedly requires." The complicated character of modern regulatory legislation and of the
problems with which it deals has increased proportionately the
difficulties in the way of ascertaining correctly the facts and interpreting correctly the law upon which duties even of the most
clearly ministerial character within the accepted tests depend;
and it is also apparent that the law ordinarily in no way relieves
an officer on account of the ministerial character of his duties
from the necessity of making all such preliminary determinations
of fact or law.' 30 Under the distinction as stated an administrative
officer's duties may be "ministerial" for liability purposes although
both adequate notice and a full hearing were accorded.' 3 ' From
the point of view both of fairness to the officer and of the public
interest, the same criticisms that were directed against a rule of
absolute accountability for quasi judicial determinations lose none
of their force by reason of the "ministerial" character of the
duties ascertained by an identical process.
III. THE

QUESTION SHOULD

REASONABLENESS

BE PRI-MARILY

ONE OF THE

OF OFFICIAL ACTION

Because of a more or less articulate feeling that the aboveconsidered distinction between "quasi judicial" and "ministerial"
powers and duties is both inadequate and unsound as a test in
determining administrative liability, some courts have tended to
confine liability for the exercise even of clearly ministerial powers
and duties almost exclusively to those performed under the im1-9 Brown, Administrative Commissions and the Judicial Power, (1935)
19 MINNESoTA LAW REvi-v 261, 268-269.

laOCompare Fergus v. Brady, (1917) 277 Ill. 272, 275, 115 N. E. 393,
395 (auditor as ministerial officer held unable to challenge constitutionality
of statute upon which his powers depended) ; see also Note, Right of Ministerial Officer to Raise Defense of Unconstitutionality in Mandamus Proceedings, (1931)

15 MINNEsoTA LAw REVIEw 340.

13'And vice versa, they may be "quasi judicial" although no notice and
hearing were accorded, see notes 51, 53, and 54, supra.
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mediate supervision of a superior, and which therefore consist
entirely in obedience to his commands. 132 It would seem to be a
necessary corollary of such a rule that obedience to the command
of the superior should be a complete defense to the subordinate.
The New Jersey court appears to have gone as far as any in
almost completely obliterating any significance as regards official
liability of the distinction between "quasi judicial" and "ministerial" functions. In Tyrell v. Burke,133 the plaintiff had passed
the state board examination required of an embalmer, but had
failed to pass the examination required of a funeral director:
and the defendant members of the licensing board had refused
to issue to him an embalmer's license on the mistaken assumption
that the law required that both examinations be passed before the
embalmer's license could validly be issued. The court expressly
recognized that the only duty the defendants had failed to perform
was "ministerial" in the sense that the plaintiff could have brought
a proceeding in mandamus to compel the issuance of the license,
he having passed the only examination requisite for it."', But a
judgment in plaintiff's favor for damages was reversed on the
ground that despite "considerable ignorance of their duties by
members of the board, and perhaps also negligence in their performance, we find nothing from which it could be inferred that
what occurred exhibits malice or bad faith toward the plaintiff.
Without the latter the law affords no redress in the form of
damages by action against the members."' 135
Again in Lincoln Bus Co. v. Jersey Afutual Casulty Insurance Co.;"86 the defendant state banking commissioner who had
132See Hipp v. Ferrall, (1917) 173 N. C. 167, 169-170, 91 S. E. 831,
832, where the court asserted a broad rule of immunity even for ministerial
officers to the extent of the public character of their functions, except "in
case of subordinate officials having physical charge of public work and
where a negligent breach of duty may be clearly recognized as the, proximate cause of an injury to a claimant. In such instances, though at times
technically officers, they can scarcely be considered as being in the exercise
of governmental duties at all, but are rather administrative agents, and are
held for breach of duty, the proximate cause of the injury, whether such
duties are incident to the office they have undertaken or arise by virtue of a
contract to perform them."
"33(1933) 110 N. J.L. 225, 164 Atl. 586.
"34 Compare Roerig v. Houghton, (1919) 144 Minn. 231, 175 N. W. 542,
supra note 126. That a court will very rarely if ever interfere with an administrative determination as to whether an applicant has passed a qualifying examination, see Mitchell v. McKevitt, (1932) 128 Cal. App. 458, 17 P.
(2d) 789, noted (1934) 7 So. Cal. L. Rev. 477; see also (1931) 17 Cornell
L. Q. 103.
"3'At 110 N. J.L. 227, 164 Atl. 587.
136(1932) 10 N. J.Misc. 1114, 162 Atl. 915.
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taken over the affairs of the insolvent insurance company was
sought to be held personally liable for expenditures incurred in
assuming the defense of suits pending against the policy holders,
expenditures for such a purpose being entirely unauthorized. The
commissioner clearly had no discretion in the matter, except in so
far as the term "discretion" could be made to include for
immunity purposes the determination by him of the question of
law necessarily preliminary to the ascertainment of his duties.
The court held him not liable, saying:
"The expenditures are not, however, to be disallowed and the
commissioner made to suffer the consequences because of an
honest mistake. The statute had not been construed by the court,
and he misinterpreted its meaning. A public official, acting with
due care and diligence, under advice of counsel, in the discharge
of a public trust, is, as a matter of public policy, not liable for
mistaking his course in the performance of his duties, for otherwise the government would be seriously hampered by honest men
refusing to enter its service." 1 37
It is to be noted that the New Jersey court in the second
case emphasized that the defendant officer had been in the
exercise of "due care and diligence." Because of the rule of so
many courts relieving even ministerial officers of liability for
nonfeasance,138 such courts have been impelled to find some basis
of liability in the affirmative character of the action actually taken
as much as in the "ministerial" character of the officer's duty or
determination preliminary to it; and although not usually repudiating traditional dogma, modern courts seem to be tending more
and more to emphasize official negligence as the basis of official
liability, without particular emphasis upon the ministerial character of the powers and duties involved, and in situations in
which by the earlier law negligence should be theoretically
immaterial. In Silva v. AfacAule, 1 where the defendant officers
were held liable for the value of a truckload of crabs which they
had seized on the mistaken assumption that they were being
transported from one fish and game district into another in
violation of law, the tort involved was thus one of the conversion
137At 10 N. J. Misc. 1116, 162 AtI. 916. "The rule of law as to public
officers is that they are not personally liable upon their official contracts,
although in excess of their powers, if they are not guilty of bad faith, and
the persons with whom they contract have equal means with themselves of
knowing the extent of their authority, or the latter depends upon a public
statute." Henry v. Henry, (1905) 73 Neb. 746, 750, 103 N. W. 441, 442, 107
N. W. 789.
13lSee note 124 supra.
139(1933) 135 Cal. App. 249, 26 P. (2d) 887.
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of tangible personalty, in which under the theories already developed the element of negligence would have been entirely
unessential to liability, and as to which even a quasi judicial
character would have been no defense to liability in its absolute
"form. The court nevertheless emphasized the element of negligence by pointing out that
"No questions were asked by them of the truck driver, from
what waters the crabs had been taken. The defendants appear
to have been wholly indifferent as to whether the crabs were
taken from Port Orford or any other place; they were simply
seizing a truckload of crabs that was passing through. Had
any questions been asked of the truck driver as to the source
of the crabs, the truth or falsity of his answers as to where
they had been obtained could have been ascertained in a very
few minutes. A telephone inquiry to the quarantine station to
which we have referred would have furnished the information
within a short space of time."' 140
Similarly in Wallace v. Feehan,'41 in which officers acting
under the authority of the state conservation board were held
liable for the unnecessary destruction of a crop of growing corn
in the process of eradicating the corn borer, and the tort involved
was therefore technically one of trespass to realty, the court
nevertheless pointed out that "The gist of the liability is negligence," and that "the method of enforcing the regulations by
commissioners and boards must be reasonable."' 42 The Florida
court has stated in general terms that "diligence in the discharge
of their duties is required of public servants, particularly where
the rights of owners of property may be jeopardized by their
neglect."''
And the Iowa court has emphasized the quality of
negligence "not as the gist of the plaintiff's cause of action, but
as a destroyer of a possible affirmative defense by the defendants.
If the defendants had pleaded immunity from liability on the
ground . . . that . . . they were acting in an official capacity in

the performance of official duty, then the question of whether they
acted as reasonably prudent men under the circumstances would
14OAt 135 Cal. App. 256, 26 P. (2d) 890.
141 (Ind. App. 1932) 181 N. E. 862.
142At 181 N. E. 867. The case may properly be regarded as one of
trespass ab initio resulting from the abuse through negligence of the
privilege of entry. See Restatement, Torts, sec. 202, comment (h) ; sec.
214 (1).
143 Palm Court Corp. v. Smith, (1931) 103 Fla. 233, 236, 137 -So. 234,
236 (defendant collector of taxes held personally liable for having neglected
for five days to deposit plaintiff's check in payment of taxes, the bank on
which it had been drawn having failed on the fifth day, causing plaintiff
to lose the benefit of the payment).
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gist of the

liability" or merely "a destroyer of a possible affirmative defense"
1 5
would seem to be primarily a question of pleading. 4
All roads therefore apparently lead to the attachment of some
significance to official negligence as the basis of official liability;
and one is impelled to the conclusion that the time has come for
the development of an approach to the law of official liability
under which results will no longer turn in any case, as if by
magic, and entirely unrelated to realities, upon a conception of
"jurisdictional facts," or upon the character of the injury as
one affirmatively affecting tangible property rights, or upon a
distinction between "ministerial" and "quasi judicial" powers and
duties. The ill effects of the "jurisprudence of conceptions" involved in the traditional approach are not confined alone to the
resulting confusion and inconsistencies in the law; they extend
to causing injustice in individual instances either to the officer
or to the private individual whose interests are affected; they
stimulate toward overcaution in those very aspects of administrative action in which overcaution is least to be desired, and instill
too little fear of personal consequences in others in which the
injury to the individual affected may be no less serious; and
in the end the public interests suffer.
' 44Goold v. Saunders, (1923) 196 Iowa 380, 383, 194 N. W. 227, 228.
145See also, emphasizing official negligence as the basis of official liability, Falasco v. Hulen, (1935) 6 Cal. App. (2d) 224, 242, 44 Pac. (2d)
469, 477 (defendant ambulance driver held liable for negligently running
down plaintiff while driving injured child to hospital) : "Public officers ...
are not relieved from liability for acts of negligence;" Wolfsen v. Wheeler,
(1933) 130 Cal. App. 475, 19 Pac. (2d) 1004 (agricultural commissioner and
his deputy held liable for the death of plaintiff's sheep resulting from
thallium which the defendants had spread upon a field for the proper purpose of killing rodents, but in a negligent manner); Proper v. Sutter
Drainage Dist., (1921) 53 Cal. App. 576, 581, 200 Pac. 664, 666: "It was
negligence on the part of the trustees to collect and convey through the
canals of the district water far in excess of the carrying capacity of said
canals," causing plaintiff's lands to overflow (with this case compare Wilbrecht v. Babcock, (1930) 179 Minn. 263, 228 N. W. 916, see note 94
supra); Ham v. Los Angeles County, (1920) 46 Cal. App. 148, 163, 189
Pac. 462, 468: "If the supervisors are empowered and required to provide
for the care and repair of the highways by general rules and orders delegating the specific execution of the work to a road overseer or superintendent, and they have failed to do this, and damage to third parties results
from defects in the highway of which they have notice, they, and not the
road overseer, would seem to be liable. On the other hand, if the supervisors of the county have made and given the necessary general provisions
and directions to impose this specific duty on the road overseer, he alone
is responsible for the negligence;" McClellan v. Carter, (1923) 30 Ga.
App. 150, 177 S. E. 118 (cattle inspector held liable for dipping a bull in
such a negligent maner as to cause his death) ; Russell v. Considine, (1917)
101 Kan. 631, 168 Pac. 1095 (same).
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As a starting point it is assumed that administrative officers
are not to be placed generally in the category of judges and their
opinions accepted as the law of the land, even for the single
purpose of extending to them complete immunity for the consequences of mistaken action. Furthermore, to the extent that
administrative officers even of a clearly "quasi judicial" character
may be assumed to be liable for the consequences of malice, it is
not perceived why they should at the same time go scot free of
liability for the consequences of clear negligence in the making
of their determinations or in the action taken pursuant to them.
It has been pointed out that a private individual willing to attempt
coercion of administrative action through the threats or the actual
bringing of fictitious and vexatious suits is not likely to be
deterred by the -necessity of alleging malice ;146 and it should
follow that the existence of clear negligence as an additional basis
of liability would not be likely to increase materially the number
of suits of such a character or the threats thereof. Administrative
time is probably not yet deemed to be uniformly so precious as
to preclude even the drain thereon that would be necessitated by
the defense of substantiated and successful suits; and for the
time so lost the public may well find its compensation in the added
incentive to administrative integrity and the exercise of due care
and diligence in the first instance. On the other hand it is not
perceived why the particular character or category in which an
officer is placed by an arbitrary test, or the nature of the issue
determined or of the right affected, should ever render him
liable for less than negligence, or conduct the equivalent of it.
In the remaining pages the attempt is made to set forth and
sufficiently elaborate in a series of six propositions a formulation
for the law of official liability that is believed to be both adequate
and free of the objections inherent in the traditional approach.
1. Whenever adequate notice, a full hearing, and reasonably
specific formal fact-findings, in other words, the opportunity
for an effective contest embracing a substantial minimum of the
"judicial" safeguards, can be had without jeopardizing the public
interest through the delay incident to them, they should be held
to be a constitutional prerequisite to the administrative adjudication of personal or property rights.
For present purposes such a requirement is of the utmost
importance in two respects:
146See note 40 supra.
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(a) The self-sufficiency of the administrative process itself,
from the point of view of conserving the rights of the private
individuals whose interests are affected, is proportionately enhanced; and
(b) By transferring the emphasis from the abstract character
of administrative determinations, powers, and duties to their
effect upon personal and property rights, and requiring for that
reason, and as the rule, a substantial minimum of the main incidents of the "judicial" process, the effect is to render administrative action quite generally, as the rule rather than the exception,
"quasi judicial" in the sense of facilitating judicial review by the
extraordinary remedies.
2. Whenever the individual aggrieved by administrative action
of the above type has available a non-tortious remedy, as by direct
appeal, certiorari, declaratory judgment, mandamus, prohibition,
or injunction, and has failed to avail himself of it, a further
remedy against the officer by an action in tort is for that reason
barred.
It is frequently held that the possibilities of infra-administrative relief must have been exhausted before judicial intervention
of any sort will be granted. 4 7 The above proposition carries the
same principle a step further. As already pointed out, to a
very great extent the remedies enumerated constitute a continuation of the administrative proceeding, albeit in a judicial forum.14 1
Furthermore, because of the unfortunate situation in which an
officer acting in good faith and with the utmost diligence is
otherwise placed, justice to him should require the imposition
upon the individual of the burden of doing everything in his
power to mitigate damages, including the exhaustion of his nontortious judicial remedies. 14 9 To the extent that the relief actually
147Compare First Nat'l Bank of Greeley v. Weld County, (1924) 264
U. S. 450, 44 Sup. Ct. 385, 68 L. Ed. 784; 26 U. S. C. A., sec. 156, Mason's
U. S. Code, tit. 26, sec. 156: "No suit or proceeding shall be maintained
in any court for the recovery of any internal-revenue tax alleged to have
been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or of any penalty

claimed to have been collected without authority, or of any sum alleged

to have been excessive or in any manner wrongfully collected until a claim
for refund or credit has been duly filed with the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, . . ."
148See above, at note 115.
14Compare Dickinson, Administrative Justice and the Supremacy of
Law 66: ". . . if the case was a proper one for injunctive relief, but no such
relief was asked, the injured party ought to be precluded from later insist-

ing on damages. The cases only point to this distinction, but do not make

it articulate." But see further Jaffarian v. Murphy, (1932) 280 Mass. 402,
405, 183 N. E. 110, 111, where the court emphasized as one of the grounds

for denying recovery of damages sustained by the defendant's improper
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secured by the exhaustion of such remedies does not avoid the
damages resulting from wrongful administrative action, as in the
case of damages accruing during the necessitated delay, additional
relief by way of damages, either in the same proceeding' 0 or in a
separate action in tort against the officer, should not be precluded by reason of the second proposition alone. The effect of
adverse determinations on the merits in proceedings actually
taken under the non-tortious judicial remedies as precluding a
further action in tort against the officer is stated as proposition
four.
3. Whenever the defendant officer or officers against whom
liability in damages is asserted are themselves the fact-finding
tribunal duly "appointed by law and informed by experience" and
subject to a substantial minimum of the "judicial" safeguards in
the trial of the very issues on which the authority for their
action depends, and assuming that their liability is not entirely
precluded by reference to propositions two and four, the only
denial of a miniature golf license, that "parties aggrieved by rulings and
orders of one exercising judicial powers must seek to have errors in the
proceedings corrected by appeal or exception ....
In cases where an official
or board acting in a quasi judicial capacity within the scope of its authority
errs, commonly the law affords an aggrieved party adequate relief by
resort to one of the extraordinary remedies" (the whole tenor of this opinion
represents a definite break with the earlier and stricter Massachusetts
view) ; Steel v. Dunham, (1870) 26 Wis. 393, 398, where the court
emphasized that the plaintiff could either have enjoined collection of the
overassessment upon his property or paid and sued for a refund: "This
affords the injured party a full and ample remedy where the taxing officers
act illegally, or maliciously and corruptly, without giving him a personal
action against them;" but compare Gage v. Springer, (1904) 211 Ill. 200,
204, 71 N. E. 861, 862-863, where an action for damages resulting from a
conspiracy on the part of the defendant members of the local board of public
improvements to permit a contractor to use a cheaper grade of paving
material than required by ordinance, was held not to be precluded by the
fact that the plaintiff could have enjoined the departure from the terms of
the ordinance, or could have compelled compliance by mandamus, or could
have resisted collection of the assessment against him on the ground of the
departure. To the extent that wrongful administrative action is malicious,
the reason for requiring exhaustion of the available non-tortious remedies is
not so strong. Where administrative action proceeds by notice and hearing,
it is believed that the burden ordinarily should be upon the private individual to seek extraordinary relief, rather than upon the administrative officer
or tribunal to seek a declaratory judgment, even where that is available;
since such an administrative determination, so long as the private individual has available a means of securing judicial review that he has failed
to seek, is entitled to res adjudicata effect, see Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co.
v. Schendel, (1926) 270 U. S. 611, 46 Sup. Ct. 420, 70 L. Ed. 757; Hoffman
v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1934) 74 F. (2d) 227,
230; 50
Dennison v. Payne, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1923) 293 Fed. 333, 341.
1 Under modern statutes mandamus proceeds as an ordinary "civil
action," see State ex rel. Tracy v. Cooley, (1894) 58 Minn. 514, 518, 60
N. W. 338, and an award of damages may be made as a part of the same
proceeding, see 2 Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat., sec. 9730.
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question before the court in the action in tort is whether they
acted beyond the bounds of reasonable official action in the making
of their determination or in the action taken pursuant to it.
Such a test of liability would relieve officers of the type stated
from liability in whatsoever connections for the consequences of
honest mistakes made with proper motives and in the exercise
of due care and diligence. The same result might also be achieved
by making the question of their liability turn on whether they
had acted as reasonable men would have acted under the same
circumstances. But the suggested test of liability has been deliberately so phrased as to be for the court alone to determine,
and to present no independent jury question. It has been shown
that the objection to a rule such as that of Miller v. Horton'51 is
not alone on the ground that it permits liability without fault in
a situation in which such a liability is socially unjustifiable, but also
on the ground that it permits a lay jury in a retrial de novo to
substitute its own inexpert opinion, usually on scientific issues,
for that of the tribunal appointed for the very purpose of performing the fact-finding function on the theory that it is the one
best qualified both by training and experience to do so.
This second aspect of the objection would not be entirely
eliminated by permitting a jury to determine, as in ordinary negligence cases between private individuals, whether the defendant
officers had acted as reasonable men would have acted under the
same circumstances. The most carefully drawn instructions cannot keep out of the application of such a test of liability a certain
amount of the jury's own subjective experience, which is not
disastrous so long as the experience drawn on applies only to the
reaction of ordinary men to ordinary factual situations. In the
use of expert testimony of a scientific character the results are
less satisfactory. But it is a still further step for a jury to be
permitted to say that the determination of a fact-finding tribunal
appointed by law for the purpose was not reasonable. It may be
one thing for a jury with the aid of the dental profession to be
permitted to determine that the extraction of more than eight
teeth at one sitting is or is not tortious negligence on the part of
a dentist ;152 but it would be quite another thing for it to be permitted to award damages to a dentist against the members of a
state licensing board who had punished him professionally on
such a ground. In other words, whenever an administrative
151(1891) 152 Mass. 540, 26 N. E. 100.
1 2See Voss v. Adams, (1935) 271 Mich. 203, 259 N. W. 889.
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authority has been appointed, empowered, and equipped as a factfinding tribunal for the very purpose of supplanting the jury in
a specialized field and of developing standards therein, its own
findings and action taken pursuant to 'them constitute a more
acceptable determination than any a jury can render that such
findings and action are reasonable.
On the other hand, the function of judges, as against administrative tribunals and juries alike, is to afford protection not only
against errors of law but also against arbitrary or oppressive
action in the form of fact-findings that exceed the outermost
limits beyond which the judge cannot conceive of a sane mind not
his own reaching a like conclusion on the evidence. The distinction that it is thus sought to bring out is aptly illustrated in the
recent Minnesota case of Anderson v. Consolidated School District
No. 144.151 To the extent that a school teacher's employment is
of a contractual nature, the law generally affords as a remedy for
a wrongful removal an action for damages against the municipality employer. In such an action by a teacher discharged under
a statute limiting the school board's power of removal to "cause,"
it was held error to instruct the jury that it was for them to
determine whether the board had "acted in a reasonable and proper
manner in the determination of the question before them." The trial
court had properly warned the jury that the standard of reasonableness was not their own but that of "reasonable and competent
men," and the appellate court recognized that the question properly
raised by the case was whether the board had "acted in bad faith
or arbitrarily and capriciously upon the facts before it or properly
within its knowledge." But a finding not reasonably supported
by evidence or facts otherwise properly within the tribunal's presumed knowledge is "arbitrary and baseless."' 5 4 The result of
the case is that in an action for damages against the municipality
the only question is, not whether in the minds of a lay jury
the administrative tribunal has acted on the evidence as reasonable men would have acted, but rather whether it has acted in a
way in which reasonable men could have acted. In other words,
there is no independent jury question raised, upon which the trial
or an appellate court may not substitute its own independent
judgment for that of the jury.
Are not the same considerations of deference to the findings
153(1936) 196 Minn. 256, 264 N. W. 784.
154 See Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & Nashville
R. R., (1913) 227 U. S. 88, 91, 33 Sup. Ct. 185, 186, 57 L. Ed. 431.
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of the administrative tribunal appointed by law for the purpose,
that were thus held controlling in an action for damages against
the municipality, equally controlling when the only change in the
facts is the substitution of the members of the tribunal individually as defendants and a shift in the nature of the action from
contract to tort?
In the application of such a test of liability, it would seem
to be clear that the exercise without notice and hearing of a
power of removal that is expressly made to depend upon notice
and hearing, constitutes official action of an arbitrary and capricious character which a court is capable of saying no reasonable
official could possibly have undertaken, just as much as it may
be said of it that it constitutes entirely unofficial action because
taken without jurisdiction. 1 5 It should still be the first duty of
a public officer of whatever sort to inform himself of the single
plain meaning, so apparent that everyone who reads may understand, contained in the statutes upon which his powers depend. To
the extent that official action obviously constitutes a "usurpation"
of authority in the premises, whether because of absence or mere
abuse or excess, liability should follow. But it would be equally
beyond the bounds of reasonable official action for an officer
within his jurisdiction not to exercise good faith or give the evidence his fair consideration, but instead to be "arbitrary and
capricious" throughout. 56 And on the other hand he would be
relieved of liability so long as his errors of whatever kind, were
within the bounds of reason and good faith, and relieved also of
the hazards of a jury's independent answer to that question.
4. The effect of an adverse determination on the merits in
a proceeding actually taken under a non-tortious judicial remedy
should normally be to bar a further action in tort against the
officer.
This proposition follows from the third, since the scope of
review secured by a proceeding under any of the non-tortious
forms of judicial control" 7 is normally at least as broad as that

"'As in Stiles v. Municipal Council of Lowell, (1919) 233 Mass. 174,
123 N. C. 615, see note 71 supra.
" 0OAs in Jaffarian v. Murphy, (1932) 280 Mass. 402, 183 N. E. 110,
see note 74 supra.
"'Excepting the writ of prohibition, which is a sufficient remedy only
where there is a complete absence of jurisdiction, see State ex rel. Brandt
v. Thompson, (1904) 91 Minn. 279, 97 N. W. 887; State ex rel. Townsend
v. Ward, (1897) 70 Minn. 58, 63-64, 72 N. W. 825-826, apparent as a
matter of law, see Downs v. Lazzelle, (1916) 102 W. Va. 663, 668, 136
S. E. 195, 197.
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permitted in an action in tort against the officer under proposition
three.
5. Whenever the defendant officer or officers against whom
liability in damages is asserted are themselves the tribunal duly
"appointed by law and informed by experience" for the determination of the very issues upon which the authority for their
action depends, but the emergency character of the required
action precludes both adequate notice and hearing as well as the
possibility of preventive judicial intervention or review, the question in the action in tort should be whether they had acted in the
circumstances as reasonable men would have acted; but a court
should require very "clear evidence" to sustain a jury verdict that
they had not so acted.
Here there is neither the opportunity of an effective contest
before the administrative tribunal nor a non-tortious judicial
remedy available that can either prevent or undo the damage; so
that the only possibility of a "hearing" at all is in an action in
tort against the officer. Even so, it is believed to be the inherent
vitality of the police power rather than the rule of the Copcutt
Case5 ' that justifies dispensing in such situations with the necessity of an administrative hearing; and the "public disaster" rule
of the Restatement,159 as applied to official action, 10 should normally relieve of liability for reasonable error. One may still
doubt whether a jury of "12 men sworn to well and truly try
the cause" is the proper tribunal for passing upon the reasonableness of official determinations, though made ex parte, if of a
medical or otherwise scientific character, with such finality that a
court may not substitute its own judgment for that "of the jury
trying the case," even though convinced by the evidence of greater
probabilities in favor of the defendant officer's determination.,
But the dangers are no greater than are involved in the submission to juries of questions of a scientific character in private
controversies generally; and if a court pays adequate attention
to the "presumption" in favor of official determinations of a
scientific character, 0 2 both in its instructions and in passing
158(1893) 140 N. Y. 1, 35 N. E. 320, see note 67 supra.
' 59Sec. 196 (1), comments (a) and (f).
1619Sec. 202, comment (d).
162As held in Wallace.v. Feeban, (Ind. App. 1932) 181 N. E. 862, 867.
'6 See Rudolphe v. City of New Orleans, (1856) 11 La. Ann. 242, 243
(in action by captain of ship for damages caused by ship's being compelled
to return to Ft. Jackson for quarantine on advice of city health officer that
there was cholera aboard, city held not liable for reason that officer himself was not liable) : "He was acting officially, and we do not think the un-

TORT LIABILITY OF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICERS

313

upon the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the jury's verdict,' 63
the likelihood of individual instances of injustice in the application
of such a standard of official liability in the situations falling
under proposition five should not be great.
6. As to all other types of administrative action, that neither
proceed by notice and hearing nor involve issues of a peculiarly
scientific character, the standard of liability should normally be
whether the defendant officer or officers have acted as reasonable
men would have acted under the same circumstances.
It is of course not feasible that the formalities of notice and
hearing should precede each successive step in the carrying out
of a plan of administrative action properly determined upon; nor
that they should accompany all the manifold types of administrative action that, although not in any sense an "adjudication" of
personal or property rights, may nevertheless affect them injuriously. In all such situations liability should ordinarily be based upon
negligence in performance, whether of commission or omission;
and since the establishment of official negligence in such connections ordinarily does not involve issues of a scientific character,
the impact upon administration of lay opinion, through the
medium of a jury applying the reasonable man standard, should
not be an undesirable influence. Here the so-called "presumption"
of official rectitude is perhaps no more than synonymous with
the burden of proof, which is already upon the plaintiff without
it. Depending upon the nature of the particular case, it should
be within the trial court's discretion to permit the jury to take
into consideration the availability of a declaratory judgment at the
litigating initiative of the defendant officer in reaching its determinati6n whether he acted reasonably.
The above propositions are not set forth as of universal
application to all administrative officers. There are those administrative tribunals that have acquired such a standing as "courts
certain testimony of two or three inexperienced men should be sufficient to

invalidate his official acts.

We have repeatedly said that we will not

presume upon slight testimony that sworn officers have violated their duty
in matters of discretion confided to them, and that those who allege an
illegal exercise of that discretion should be held to establish such allegation
by conclusive proof."
163For such a presumption to have significance at this later stage in
the trial, it must of course be given more than the mere procedural effect of
sustaining the burden of coming forward with evidence until a minimum
quantity of rebutting evidence has been introduced by the one against
whom the presumption operates. But that presumptions may properly be and
often are given the suggested additional effect, see forgan, Some Observations Concerning Presumptions, (1931) 44 Harv. L. Rev. 906, 931-932.
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in effect and in fact"16
as already to have secured by clear
precedents a full measure of the judicial immunity. They are
suggested, however, as adequate standards of maximum liability
for the rank and file of administrative officers and tribunals until
such time as they individually acquire by experience "a competence
comparable to the traditional ability of . . . judges" and "the
methods of deliberation and decision" of courts, so as to become
"courts in effect and in fact"'165 and as such therefore entitled to
be unreasonable. 66
164 See McFarland, Administrative Agencies in Government and the

Effect Thereon of Constitutional Limitations, (1934)
612, 623.
65

20 A. B. A. Journ.

1 See McFarland, Administrative Agencies in Government and the
Effect Thereon of Constitutional Limitations, (1934) 20 A. B. A. Journ.
612, 623.
166The approach developed dispenses with the necessity of separate
consideration of the problem of officers who act under statutes later held
to be unconstitutional, for which see Field, The Effect of an Unconstitutional Statute in the Law of Public Officers: Liability of Officer for Action
or Nonaction, (1928) 77 U. Pa. L. Rev. 155; Rapacz, Protection of Officers
Who Act Under Unconstitutional Statutes, (1927) 16 MINNESrA LAW
REVw 585.

